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INTRODUCTION

Ronny Zamora was fifteen years old when he shot and killed an
elderly neighbor in Florida in the mid-1970s.' At trial, Zamora entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and his attorney, Ellis Rubin, argued that Zamora had become involuntarily and
subliminally intoxicated by violent television programming-the socalled "television intoxication" defense. 2 The trial judge excluded a
defense expert's testimony on the effects of television violence upon
children,3 and Zamora was subsequently convicted "in record time."4
I See Zamora v. State, 422 So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); see also PatriciaJ.
Falk, Novel Theories of CriminalDefense Based upon the Toxicity of the SocialEnvironment: Urban
Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731, 742-48 (1996) (discussing the facts of Zamora, as well as the defense of television intoxication generally).

2 According to Professor Falk, as of 1996 there were only two cases other than Zamora
in which defendants used, or attempted to use, this defense; however, both defendants
were unsuccessful. See Falk, supra note 1, at 745-46 (discussing State v. Quillen, No. S87-080118, 1989 Del. Super. LEXIS 129 (Mar. 28, 1989), and State v. Molina, No. 84-2314 (Fla.
Dade County Ct. filed Oct. 1984), both of which involved defendants who unsuccessfully
attempted to use the defense).
3 The trial judge held the testimony to be irrelevant. For the portion of the trial
transcript relating to the court's decision to disallow this testimony, see JOHN MONAHAN &
LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 446-52 (3d ed. 1994).
This was a hotly contested issue on appeal. See infra note 4; see also ELLIS RUBIN & DARY
MATERA, "GEr ME ELLIS RUBIN!": THE LIFE, TIMES, AND CASES OF A MAVERICK LAWYER 51
(1989) (arguing that the trial judge's exclusion of the expert testimony, seventy-eight scientific studies, and published stories regarding the effect of television violence on children
was incorrect).
4 Falk, supra note 1, at 743. It took the jury less than two hours to return a guilty

verdict. Id. at 743 n.57 (citing Donna Gehrke, Trial Over, but Ordeal Continues: TVlntoxication Murder Case Still HauntsPrincipals,MIAMi HERALD, Dec. 3, 1989, at IG). Falk notes that
the Zamora case also sparked considerable subsequent litigation on appeal:
In state courts, Rubin appealed on the ground that the trial court erred in
excluding the expert testimony on the negative effects of violent television
on children, but the Florida Court of Appeals rejected the appeal. Zamora
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However, considering past public reactions in cases where the insanity
defense was used successfully, such as that of John Hinckley, Jr.,5 one
can only imagine the outrage that would have resulted had the jury
been permitted to hear the excluded testimony and had thereafter
found Zamora legally insane.
To say that the insanity defense is merely controversial would be a
vast understatement. 6 Cases such as those of Ronny Zamora andJohn
Hinckley give rise to public furor at the mere announcement of a defendant's intent to assert the insanity defense, not to mention the exponential growth of this vehemence if the defense is ultimately
successful. 7 Yet if one considers the actual impact of the defense on
thereafter retained new counsel and appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel; this appeal was also denied. After exhausting the appellate process in Florida, Zamora mounted a habeas corpus challenge in the
federal courts, again claiming, inter alia, that he had been denied effective
assistance of counsel because Rubin had tried the unlikely defense of television intoxication. The federal courts were not sympathetic to this argument ....
...The final piece of litigation resulting from this case was a civil suit
by Zamora and his parents against the three major television networks. The
federal district court dismissed the suit ....
Id. at 743-44 (footnotes omitted).
5
Hinckley shot and wounded President Ronald Reagan and three other persons,
including Press Secretary James Brady, as the President was walking to his limousine after
an appearance at a hotel in Washington, D.C. Many people witnessed the shooting, and
millions more watched it happen on national television. After a seven-week trial, Hinckley
was found NGRI, and was subsequently committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital by U.S. DistrictJudge Barrington D. Parker. See RrrAJ. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANrIY
DEFENSE: A CRmcAL ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE PosT-HINcKLEY ERA 1 (1988).
As Professors Simon and Aaronson explain, the Hinckley acquittal resulted in "swift emotional demands for changes in the insanity defense laws." Id.
6
Cf. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THEJURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 3 (1994) ("No
aspect of the criminal justice system is more controversial than is the insanity defense....
[N]o other aspect of the criminal law inspires position papers from trade associationsspanning the full range of professions and political entities." (emphasis added)); SIMON & AARONSON, supranote 5, at 2 ("Perhaps no other area of the criminal law has been subject to
more controversy.. . ."); George L. Blau & Richard A. Pasewark, Statutory Changes and tile
Insanity Defense: Seeking the Perfect Insane Person, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 69, 69 (1994)
("[The insanity defense] is one of the most frequently appearing topics in legal literature."); Lisa Callahan et al., Insanity Defense Reform in the United States-Post-Hinckley, 11
MENTAL & PHYsICAL DISABILTrY L. REP. 54, 54 (1987) (asserting that "[t]he insanity defense
is among the most hotly debated and controversial issues in mental health law").
7 The mere possibility that a person could be absolved of responsibility for his actions when his guilt is clear seems to be what both puzzles and angers members of the
general public, regardless of whether the defense, in reality, actually works. This seems to
"reflect our basic dissatisfaction... with the notion of psychiatric excuses allowing a 'guilty'
defendant to 'beat the rap' and escape punishment." Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity DefenseJurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599,
613 (1989-1990). As Professor Perlin also argues:
[T]he [perceived] abuse of the insanity defense symbolizes the alleged
breakdown of law and order, the thwarting of punishment .... the failure
of the crime control model, and the ascendancy of a "liberal," exculpatory,
excuse-ridden jurisprudence ....
The successful use of the defense ...
symbolizes, on a psychodynamic level, the thwarting of punishment of the
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the criminal justice system, perhaps no other legal topic receives a
more disproportionate amount of attention. 8
Even with all of this attention, though, misperceptions about the
insanity defense are, as studies and accounts have shown, nothing
short of remarkable, 9 and result in repeated calls from all segments of
errant child who commits the perfect Oedipal crime against the perfect
father figure, making the subsequent furor inevitable.
Id. at 621-22 (footnotes omitted); see also Donald HJ. Hermann, The Insanity Defense, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 987, 987 (1983) ("[Tlhe view [is] often expressed that too many criminals
escape punishment by pleading and, in some instances, feigning insanity. The general
view is that the insanity defense... is too often a means for defendants to escape theirjust
punishment." (footnote omitted)) (reviewing WILLIAMJ. WINSLADE &JUDITH WILSON Ross,
THE INSANITY PLEA (1983)). If one compares the aftermath of the Hinckley case (in which
the defense was successful) to that of Zamora, Jeffrey Dahmer, or David Berkowitz (all
cases in which insanity was pleaded but was ultimately rejected), one would realize that the
public's outrage seems to subside quickly if the result of the trial is a conviction. However,
this is certainly not the case if ajury happens to find the defense persuasive, especially in a
sensational case such as Hinckley's. See HARRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFrER
HINCKLEY- EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 1-2 (1993). Steadman states that, because of their convictions,
neither the Dahmer nor the Berkowitz cases incited an outcry calling for
revision of the insanity defense. After their convictions the press, the public, and legislators moved on to other issues. But the John Hinckley case
was another matter....
[It was not so much Hinckley's plea.., as it was
his acquittal by reason of insanity [that caused the outcry for insanity defense reform] ....
It therefore seems that in the eyes of the public, when the defense is asserted and the trial
results in a conviction, the system works after all; yet if the trial results in a NGRI verdict,
the system has failed for allowing a "wrong verdict" to come about. Quite possibly, as Dr.
Loren Roth has suggested, "the American public may simply be nothing more than a 'bad
loser.'" PERLIN, supra note 6, at 16 (quoting Loren H. Roth, Preserve but Limit the Insanity
Defense, 58 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 91, 91 (1986-87)).
8 See Blau & Pasewark, supra note 6, at 69. According to Christina Studebaker,
"[i]nsanity is a legal defense that is raised relatively infrequently, and rarely pleaded successfully." Christina A. Studebaker, Evaluating the Insanity Defense: Identifying Empirical and
Moral Questions, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 345, 345 (1998) (reviewing BARBARA R.
IRWIN, THE MAD, THE BAD, AND THE INNOCENT: THE CRIMINAL MIND ON TRIAL (1997)).

Some studies have placed the frequency with which the defense is used at less than one
percent of all criminal trials. See, e.g., SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 5, at 7 ("[T]he insanity defense.., is introduced as a defense in less than 1 percent of all criminal trials.").
To demonstrate this infrequency more concretely, Steadman and his coauthors note that
"[i] n New York there were only two insanity pleas for every 1,000 felony arrestsin 1978, and
in California there were only five insanity acquittals for every 1,000 felony convictions in
1980." STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 5 (citations omitted).
9 For example, as Steadman and his coauthors observe, "the public and its legislators' perceptions of the insanity defense are badly skewed ....
[Clollege students overestimated the number of insanity pleas by a factor of 800 and.., legislators overestimated the
number by a factor of 400." STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 5. Blau and Pasewark paint a
similar picture:
Requested to estimate the percentage of indicted defendants who entered
the defense, various groups in Wyoming grossly overestimated its frequency. State hospital aides estimated 57%, community residents estimated
43%, college students estimated 37%, police officers estimated 22%, legislators estimated 20%, mental health center professionals estimated 17%, and
state hospital professionals estimated 13%. Similar over-estimations were
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society to abolish the defense. Quite possibly, the desire to condemn
also provided when respondents estimated the number of persons making
the plea who were actually adjudicated NGRI. College students estimated
44%, state hospital aides estimated 43%, legislators estimated 40%, community residents estimated 38%, police estimated 25%, state hospitals [sic]
professionals estimated 21%, and mental health center professionals estimated 19%. In fact, of the 22,012 indicted defendants, 102 [0.46%] had
presented the defense. Of these 102 defendants, only one [0.0045% of the
22,012] was found NGRI.
Blau & Pasewark, supra note 6, at 74 (footnotes omitted). In addition to misperceptions
regarding the insanity defense's perceived use and success, other beliefs resulting from
illogical or wholly incorrect assumptions lead to even more animosity towards the defense.
They include, but are not limited to, beliefs "(1) that the insane, through the insanity
defense, escape punishment; (2) that a successful insanity defense is easily engineered; (3)
that the insanity defense . . . places an unfair burden on the prosecution," NORMAN J.
FINKEL,

INSANrrY

ON

TRLL, 124 (1988), and (4) that the use of the defense "will thwart the

criminal justice system's crime-control component." Perlin, supra note 7, at 710. Focusing
on the misperceptions and unsupported rhetoric of legislators and other government officials, Professor Perlin gives the following account of post-Hinckley trial congressional debates regarding proposed legislation designed to limit the insanity defense:
Former Attorney General Meese argued that eliminating the insanity defense would "rid... the streets of some of the most dangerous people that
are out there, that are committing a disproportionate number of crimes."
Senator Strom Thurmond criticized the insanity defense for "exonerat[ing]
a defendant who obviously planned and knew exactly what he was doing."
Senator Dan Quayle endorsed constituents' views that asserted [sic] the insanity defense "pampered criminals," and that the defense was "decadent,"
giving defendants the right to kill "with impunity." Nearly as dramatically,
Senator Steve Symms argued that the insanity defense reflected a criminal
justice system "no longer representative of the interests of a civilized
society."
Senators Larry Pressler and Orrin Hatch called the defense "a rich
man's defense." Congressman Myers alleged that it provided a "'safe harbor' for criminals who bamboozle ajury" into thinking they should not be
held responsible. Congressman Sensenbrenner portrayed the insanity trial
as "protracted testimonial extravaganzas pitting high-priced prosecution experts against equally high-priced defense experts." In perhaps the most bizarre statement, Congressman Lagomarsino-in testimony characterized by
Congressman John Conyers as "thoughtful"-asserted that the controlling
insanity defense test was that of Durham v. United States [214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v. Browner, 471 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (en banc)] "that broadened the insanity defense to include everything from alcoholism and drug addiction to heartburn and itching."
Former Attorney General William French Smith charged, "There must
be an end to the doctrine that allows so many persons to commit crimes of
violence, to use confusing procedures to their own advantage and then
have the door opened for them to return to the society they victimized."
PERLIN, supra note 6, at 17-19 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Perhaps what is
most remarkable (or disturbing, depending on how one characterizes it) is that these
myths retain vitality even given the effect they can have on organizations that know or
should know of their falsity or lack of empirical or logical support. As Perlin articulates:
Perhaps even more bizarre, embarrassing, and ominous [than the statements mentioned above] is the concession made in the House Report that
accompanied the Insanity Defense Reform Act [18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000)].
The drafters conceded that the basic beliefs about the insanity defense were
"myths," but justified the new legislation because the myths "undermined
public faith in the criminal justice system." This concession-that Congress

1514

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1509

what in reality is almost never utilized (and even less likely to be successful) 10 is a product not of what the insanity defense is, but of what
these groups perceive it to be.
Nevertheless, legislators do pay lip service to these calls for reform,1 1 and many even lead such campaigns themselves;1 2 still, the
results are often negligible. Indeed, even after a sensational case,
most of the pointed focus on reforming the insanity defense dies
down without implementation of any significant changes.13 However,
must assuage sentiment it knows to be false-reflects the myths' lasting

power.
Id. at 20 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, as Perlin indicates in a footnote to this striking

observation, "notwithstanding clinical evaluations or behavioral realities, St. Elizabeth's
Hospital's Forensic Division staff 'can be counted upon' to oppose any conditional release
recommendation in cases of 'controversial' patients." Id. at 20 n.37 (citing FinalReport of the
NationalInstitute of Mental Health (NIMH)Ad Hoc ForensicAdvisory Pane4 12 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABIuTv L. REP. 78, 96 (1988)). Further, Dr. Goldstein asserts that the American
Psychiatric Association supported limitations on federal evidentiary rules as to the scope of
expert testimony in insanity cases not because the Association thought it was a good idea,
but rather because of its concern about negative public attitudes toward "unfavorable" forensic participation in "controversial" cases. See Robert Lloyd Goldstein, The Psychiatrist's
Guide to Right and Wrong: PartIV- The Insanity Defense and the UltimateIssue Rule, 17 BULL.AM.
AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 269, 279-80 (1989).
10 See supra notes 8-9.
11
See supranote 9.
12 For example, in 1979, Montana state representative Michael H. Keedy both drafted
and introduced a bill calling for the abolition of Montana's insanity defense, which became
law shortly thereafter. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
13 Considering the public's contempt for the defense, it seems somewhat paradoxical
that this is true. That is to say, if the vast majority of the population believes that major
insanity defense reform is necessary, in a democratic society one would expect that the
legislature would vote accordingly. One explanation for the lack of significant reform
might be the concept of paternalism. See generallyJOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM (1983) (dis-

cussing the theory of paternalism and examining its application in various contexts of
American public policy); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 134-67 (photo. reprint 1973)

(1859) (discussing the limits of government authority over individuals); DONALD VAN(1986) (discussing when it is justifiable for government to intervene in the lives of competent and
incompetent persons); John D. Hodson, The Principle of Paternalism, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 61
(1977) (discussing paternalism and proposing criteria for identifying cases in which paternalism is justified); David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism,74 VA. L. REV. 519
(1988) (discussing paternalism and arguing that courts should be reluctant to act for paternalist reasons in the absence of legislative direction). Yet this notion seems inconsistent
with the ideals of a democratic society. As Professor Shapiro writes, "paternalism has not
been held in high regard by democratic theorists and practitioners. The idea . . .was
described only recently as an 'almost "un-American" rationale for any type of government
activity.'" Id at 519 (footnote omitted) (quoting Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk
Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1103 (1983)). Nonetheless, Shapiro notes that "we do not
live in a world of absolutes, and [John Stuart] Mill's modern-day heirs recognize, as he did,
that [one's] capacity to choose may be impaired by such conditions as youth, mental state,
or ignorance." Id. Perhaps it is this factor-that most members of the public are ignorant
to the realities of the insanity defense as well as its fundamental and necessary place in the
Anglo-American system of criminal law-that leads many legislators to decline to significantly reform their insanity defense laws, even if they do take some symbolic action, however trivial. This explanation certainly is consistent with the above definition of
DEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS OF BENEVOLENCE
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some states have actually followed through on their promises to reform the insanity defense. 14 My focus in this Note is on four such
states-Idaho, Montana, Utah, and, most recently, Kansas-that have
taken an extreme approach to insanity defense reform by passing legislation restricting the admission of psychiatric evidence to the issue of
mens rea, thus abolishing insanity as a separate affirmative defense.15
paternalism, but with an interesting twist, in that the paternalistic result is achieved not
through affirmative legislative action, but rather through its failure to act. But cf. id. at 531
("At the level of legislation-action by the people's elected representatives-there is no
doubt that paternalist motives have contributed to the enactment of many laws." (emphasis
added)).
That being said, one might respond by questioning why a handful of state legislatures
(namely, the four that have actually "abolished" the insanity defense-discussed infra at
Part I) have actually made the decision to indulge their constituents' desires to live in an
insanity defense-free state. Two possible answers come to mind. The first is that the legislators in these particular states do not see it as their place to act contrary to the wishes of a
majority of their constituents. However, this seems unlikely, given that legislators regularly
act in just such a manner. Indeed, accomplishing one's political agenda as a legislator
often requires compromise, and this might occur through such off-the-record mechanisms
as vote-trading (i.e., voting against constituents' wishes on one issue in order to secure a
vote in favor of their wishes on another, possibly more politically important issue). Thus,
to say that the legislators in these states do not subscribe to paternalistic values is probably
incorrect. A second, more plausible reason is that in these four states, legislators simply
saw it as too politically unsound to continue to work against the desires of their constituents. In other words, paternalism does have its limits, and where the political pressure is
such that a legislator cannot continue to act paternalistically without sacrificing popularity
among her constituents, the desire to win votes rather than the desire to do what is in the
public's best interests will almost always dictate the legislator's future actions in regard to
that issue-at least if the legislator desires reelection. Therefore, either the political pressure to enact more serious insanity defense reform laws was greater in these four states, or
the legislators in these states simply had a lower "breaking point" before they abandoned
their paternalistic mindset and adopted a more democratic approach to their activity on
this issue.
14 See STEADMAN Er AL., supranote 7, at 34-39. The most common types of reforms
were made in the area of release and commitment procedures. Id. at 35. The next most
common reform concerned the burden of proof (either shifting the burden to the defense
or increasing it), while another approach was to change the test of insanity entirely. Id. at
36. A fourth approach, popular with the public and legislators, was to adopt the "guilty but
mentally ill" (GBMI) verdict. Id. at 38. Finally, some states adopted reforms in trial procedures (for example, adopting a bifurcated insanity trial). See id.
15 See Act of Mar. 14, 1996, ch. 225, § 1, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 737, 737 (codified at
IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Michie 1948-1997)); Act of May 13, 1995, ch. 251, § 20, 1995 Kan.
Sess. Laws 1187, 1213 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995)); Act of May 17, 1991,
ch. 800, § 150, 1991 Mont. Laws 3011, 3074 (codified at MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-1-2
(2001)); Act of Feb. 4, 1999, ch. 2, § 1, 1999 Utah Laws 2, 2 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-305 (1999)). "These states were not the first to contemplate abolition of the insanity
defense. Early in the twentieth century, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Washington enacted
statutes barring a!/ evidence of mental condition; these statutes ultimately failed on constitutional grounds, most notably as violations of due process." Recent Developments, 118
Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990), 104 HARv. L. REv. 1132, 1132 n.2 (1991); see Sinclair v.
State, 132 So. 581, 584-87 (Miss. 1931) (Ethridge, J., concurring) (finding a violation of
the federal due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses);
State v. Lange, 123 So. 639, 641-42 (La. 1929) (finding a violation of the state due process
clause); State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1023-24 (Wash. 1910) (finding a violation of the
state due process clause). But see State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 932-33 (Idaho 1990) (Mc-
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This drastic change, resulting in a statutory scheme commonly
referred to as the "mens rea approach," has provoked a flurry of fierce
debate over whether such a law is morally correct, and whether it represents sound policy. 16 My purpose, though, is not to explore these
particular aspects of the controversy. Rather, it is to join the relatively
sparse debate over the constitutionality of the mens rea approach by
discussing the numerous constitutional questions it raises.
Part I of this Note supplies background information regarding
the insanity defense, the mens rea approach, and the differences between the two. In Part I.A, this Note gives a brief introduction to the
insanity defense. In Part I.B, this Note explores the origins of the
mens rea approach. In so doing, it first illustrates the traditional vehicles through which a defendant could introduce evidence of mental
abnormality, and then outlines the history of insanity defense reform
in the context of the abolition of the defense 17 and the subsequent
adoption of the mens rea approach. In Part I.C, this Note explains
how a switch to the mens rea approach affects the determination of a
defendant's culpability. Part II establishes what courts have already
said about the constitutionality of the mens rea approach by dissecting
Devitt, J., dissenting) (arguing that Strasburgand Sinclairmay not necessarily stand for the
proposition that only statutes completely disallowing evidence of mental condition are unconstitutional, and that the statute struck down in Strasburg was actually a "mens rea approach" statute of sorts). The Louisiana, Mississippi, and Washington statutes differ
substantially from the Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Kansas statutes, as the latter clearly allow
evidence of mental condition, but only in regard to mens rea. See infra Part I.
16 For abolitionist arguments, see, for example, RUDOLPH JOSEPH GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 85-89 (1984); SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF
CRIME: A STUDY OF CAUSES, PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT 212-28, 341-42 (1967); H.L.A.
HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 24-25 (1964); NORVAL MoRRIS, MADNESS AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); THOMAS S. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACrICES 123-46 (1963); WINSLADE & ROSS,
supra note 7, at 1-20, 198-226; BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST 65-93 (2d ed. 1981); Alexander D. Brooks,
The Merits of Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SoC. SCI. 125
(1985); Joseph Goldstein, The BrawnerRule-Why? or No More Nonsense on Non Sense in the
Ciminal Law, Please!, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 126; Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the
"InsanityDefense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Norval Morris, Psychiatry and the Dan-

gerous Criminal 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514, 514-20, 544-47 (1968). For retentionist arguments,
see, for example, HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972); ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 222-26 (1967); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 131-35 (1968); James B. Brady, Abolish the Insanity Defense?No!, 8 Hous. L. REv. 629 (1971); Hyman Gross, Justice and the Insanity Defense, 477 ANNALS

AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 96 (1985); Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMtBRIDGE L.J. 273 (1968);John Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Ye4 26 RUTGERS L.
REv. 719 (1973); Perlin, supra note 7; Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of

the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY L.J. 9 (1982).
17
In this Note, the use of the word "abolish" with regard to the insanity defense,
unless otherwise indicated, stands only for abolishing insanity as an "extrinsic" defense, see
infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text, and not for disallowing relevant evidence of
mental disease or defect in order to negative the mens rea of the crime charged. See infra
Part I.

2002]

THE CRAZIEST REFORM OF THEM ALL

1517

various major cases dealing with the issue. In Part III, through critical
analysis of both the constitutional implications of the abolition of the
insanity defense as well as the mens rea approach in general, this Note
demonstrates the flaws in many of the arguments advanced by the
courts discussed in Part II. Specifically, Part III focuses on three constitutional problems: due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, this Note concludes by asserting that
because of the politically charged nature of the insanity defense reform, as well as its effect on a small, unpopular, and politically vulnerable segment of individuals, judges in both state and federal courts
must be wary of allowing political influences and reputational concerns to interfere with correct and well-reasoned constitutional analysis in this area.
I
BACKGROUND

A. The Insanity Defense Generally
The insanity defense is typically considered an affirmative defense, in that it is raised by the defendant, who normally carries the
burden of persuasion.' 8 It also is alternatively considered either a
'Justification" or "excuse" defense, depending on the commentator.' 9
By this, it is meant that the insanity defense serves to exculpate the
defendant even when the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
all elements of the offense charged, including the requisite mens
rea. 20 For purposes of clarity and consistency, I will avoid using the
terms 'Justification," "excuse," and "affirmative defense" in this Note
and will instead refer to any defense raised by the defendant that can
18

See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AuSTIN W. Scorr, JR., SuBsTANTrvE CRIMINAL LAw

§ 2.13(c), at 232-33 (2d ed. 1986). This does not necessarily mean the defendant must
always carry the burden of proof when raising the defense. In some jurisdictions, the prosecution carries the burden of proof and must sufficiently demonstrate that the defendant
was not insane. See id. Nonetheless, it is an affirmative defense because the defendant
must raise it initially.
19 Criminal law theorists have long debated the differences, if any, between the labels
"justification" and "excuse." See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAV
(1978); Kent Greenawalt, The PerplexingBorders ofJustificationand Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1897 (1984); Heidi M. Hurd,Justffication and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1551 (1999). However, such a discussion, while fascinating, is beyond the
scope of this Note. See infra note 21 and accompanying text (avoiding the use of the terms
"justification" and "excuse" by adopting the term "extrinsic defense").
20 LaFave and Scott explain that sometimes the circumstances giving rise to a defense
of insanity will warrant the conclusion that the defendant did not possess the requisite
mens rea. 1 LAFAvE & Sco-r-r, supra note 18, § 4.1(b), at 429-30. This, however, is rarely
the case, as Part I.C. explains. Further, the defense of insanity makes such an inquiry
unnecessary in the first place. Because insanity is a broader concept than that of mens rea,
even those who clearly possess the requisite mens rea may be exculpated under the insanity
defense. See id.

1518

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1509

exculpate despite the state's ability to prove all elements of the offense
charged as an "extrinsic defense," a term suggested by Susan
2
Mandiberg. 1
B.

The Origins of the Mens Rea Approach
1. IntroducingEvidence of Mental Abnormality Under Traditional
Statutory Schemes

Prior to 1979, every jurisdiction had an extrinsic defense of insanity-the vehicle a defendant would typically use in order to introduce evidence of his mental abnormality. 22 However, this was not the
only manner in which a defendant might seek to introduce such evidence. Theoretically, the defendant could introduce evidence of
mental disease or defect in two of the following ways: either as part of
an extrinsic insanity defense or as an effort to negative the mens rea
of a crime with which the defendant is charged. 23 As Professor
Mandiberg explains:
Evidence of mental abnormality [can] potentially [be used in] either [way], depending on the specific facts and the charge involved.
Assume a murder statute... in which the crime is defined as intentionally causing the death of another human being. A psychotic
who perceived his attacker to be a bear and killed it, only to discover later that he had killed a person, would have a negativing [insanity] defense: If the jury believed [t] his evidence, the prosecution
could not prove "intent to kill a human being." A psychotic who
believed that God was commanding him to kill that person, however, would not have a negativing [insanity] defense: Even if the
jurors believed [t]his evidence, they could still conclude that he had
21 See Susan F. Mandiberg, Protecting Society and Defendants Too: The ConstitutionalDilemma of Mental Abnormality and Intoxication Defenses, 53 FoRDHuAM L. REv. 221, 225 (1984).
The insanity defense, therefore, would be considered an extrinsic defense, and I will refer
to it henceforth as either an "extrinsic defense of insanity" or an "extrinsic insanity
defense."
Although the actual test used for determining insanity varies among jurisdictions, for
the purposes of this Note I will assume that a defendant would successfully raise an extrinsic insanity defense if he could establish to the satisfaction of the trier of fact that he did
not know the nature or quality of his act, or if he did, that he did not know what he was
doing was wrong. See 1 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 18, § 4.1(a), at 427. This particular
test is known as the M'Naghten rule and is the dominant test among thejurisdictions. See id.
22
See SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 5, at 251-63.
23 I will refer to the latter method as a "negativing defense of insanity" or a "negativing insanity defense." Professor Mandiberg might describe the mens rea approach, then,
as a negativing defense, see Mandiberg, supra note 21; however, I will not. The use of the
phrase "mens rea approach" does not connote a particular type of defense; that is what I
will refer to by the term "extrinsic insanity defense" and "negativing insanity defense."
Rather, it connotes an entire statutory scheme in which a defendant may present only the
negativing defense of insanity, not the extrinsic insanity defense.
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the intent to kill a human being. He might, however, have an extrinsic [insanity] defense, depending on the jurisdiction[ ] .... 24
Both defendants in Professor Mandiberg's hypothetical could
prevail under an extrinsic insanity defense, but only one could successfully raise a negativing insanity defense. Therefore, the latter defendant in Mandiberg's example, who possessed the requisite mens
rea but would not be culpable under an extrinsic insanity defense,
would introduce the evidence only by way of the extrinsic defense;
conversely, the former defendant in Mandiberg's example, who would
succeed under either method of utilizing the evidence, theoretically
25
could choose how to introduce it.
2.

The Road to Reform: Adoption of the Mens Rea Approach

While the extrinsic insanity defense has alvays been controversial,
the first attempts to do away with it did not actually occur until the
early part of the twentieth century, when Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Washington each attempted to abolish the defense through statutes
allowing no evidence of mental disease or defect to be admissible
through any means. 26 Subsequently, the supreme courts of each state
struck down these statutes as unconstitutional. 27 As a result,
lawmakers made no further efforts to abolish the defense, and until
the mid-1970s insanity defense abolitionists were unsuccessful in convincing either Congress or state legislatures to embrace their position.
However, according to Professor Wales, writing in a 1976 article,
Id. at 226-27 (footnotes omitted).
Many jurisdictions, however, require defendants to use the extrinsic insanity defense as the sole vehicle to introduce evidence of mental abnormality, and thus refuse to
allow the defendant to use it to negative mens rea. See id. at 223 n.13, 227. In ajurisdiction
where choice is possible, there are both advantages and disadvantages in choosing to use
evidence of mental abnormality as part of a negativing insanity defense as opposed to using
it to support an extrinsic insanity defense. For example, a not-guilty verdict arguably carries less of a stigma than an NGRI verdict, a factor that might influence a defendant who
could possibly raise a successful negativing insanity defense to attempt to obtain a full
acquittal. However, if no NGRI option is available, ajury might be reluctant to fully acquit
an obviously dangerous defendant if such an acquittal would result in his complete freedom (i.e., no supervision or control by the state). On that note, because of the relationship between the two types of insanity defenses, see supra note 20, an NGRI verdict would
be guaranteed where a defendant could use such evidence to successfully raise a negativing
24
25

insanity defense; therefore, a defendant might not want to take his chances with the jury
and risk a possible guilty verdict. Additionally, an NGRI verdict almost always results in
subsequent civil commitment, while a not guilty verdict does not. See 1 LAFAvE & Scorr,
supra note 18, § 4.1(c) (3), at 431. Such consequences might influence a defendant to
choose a negativing insanity defense. However, in presenting such clear evidence of his
dangerous mental abnormality to the court, the defendant would be demonstrating, quite
clearly, his future dangerousness if he were not subject to state supervision and control,
and would thus almost guarantee his subsequent civil commitment after being fully
acquitted.
26 See supra note 15.
27 See supra note 15.
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[a] s debate over the function and administration of the insanity defense has heightened in recent years, abolition of the defense has
become an increasingly serious alternative....
Born of frustrations over the administration of the insanity defense,
the death of the Durham experiment, and the rising influence of the
behaviorist position, the abolitionist argument has become respecta28
ble for liberal and conservative alike.
This frustration became most apparent with the proposal of the
Criminal Justice Reform Act of 197529 (popularly known as S. 1) in
Congress. 30 Under section 522 of S. 1, a viable defense exists if "the
defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state of
mind required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease
or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense." 31 This is the typical language of the mens rea approach, which allows evidence of
mental disease or defect only to negate the mens rea of a crime with
which the defendant is charged. 32 Ultimately, Congress did not pass
S. 1,3 3 but in 1979 Montana statutorily adopted the mens rea ap-

proach and thus became the first jurisdiction to eliminate insanity as
an extrinsic defense since Louisiana, Mississippi, and Washington attempted to do so early in the 1900s. 34 Idaho and Utah soon followed
suit, with Kansas becoming the fourth state to do so in 1995. 35 Addi-

tionally, the legislatures of Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Massachusetts
28 Heathcote W. Wales, An Analysis of the Proposalto "Abolish" the InsanityDefense in S. 1:
Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 687-88 (1976) (footnotes omitted). The "Durham experiment" refers to the case of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1954), overruledby United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc), which
held that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect." Id. at 874-75. The so-called "product rule" was overruled almost two decades after the Durham decision, in large part because "of undue dominance by the [medical] experts giving testimony." Brawner, 471 F.2d at 969.
The behaviorist position argues "that free will is an illusion and that behavior is conditioned by numerous forces, so that the sole function of the criminal law should be to
modify the personalities of those committing antisocial acts. Accordingly, insanity becomes relevant only at the sentencing-dispositional stage." Wales, supra, at 688 n.4 (citing
PACKER, supra note 16, at 12).
29 S. 1, 94th Cong. § 522 (1975).
30 Wales, supra note 28, at 687.
31 Id. (quoting the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. 1, 94th Cong.
(1975)).
32 See supra note 23.
3
SeeJodie English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk: Federal CriminalLaw and the
Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HAsTINGs L.J. 1, 1 (1988) (noting that the enactment of the
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000), followed years of previous
unsuccessful attempts to abolish the insanity defense, including the unenacted Criminal
Justice Reform Act of 1975).
34 See Rita D. Buitendorp, Note, A Statutory Lesson from "Big Sky Country" on Abolishing
the Insanity Defense, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 965, 965 & n.4 (1996).
35 See Raymond L. Spring, Farewell to Insanity: A Return to Mens Rea, J. KAN. B. Ass'N,
May 1997, at 38, 39; supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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in 1995, 3 6 but they have
considered adopting the mens rea 3approach
7
yet.
of
as
laws
not passed any such
C.

How the Mens Rea Approach Affects Determinations of
Culpability

Whereas many jurisdictions require the defendant to use an extrinsic insanity defense regardless of whether a negativing insanity defense would be successful, 38 the mens rea approach requires just the
opposite-it forces defendants to use a negativing insanity defense.
The practical ramifications of adopting the mens rea approach are
enormous, but the full panoply of these effects can be elusive upon
first impression. Some further commentary should illuminate this distinction. As Marc Rosen notes:
In order for a mentally ill offender to be excused under the
mens rea approach, she must establish mental incapacity which prevents her from formulating the mens rea of the crime. The classic
example is the defendant who, because of his mental disease, believed that he was squeezing a lemon when in fact he was strangling
his victim. In such a case, the prosecution has the duty of proving
intent. However, the prosecution would fail under the mens rea approach because evidence of a mental disease or defect would show
that the defendant truly believed that he was squeezing a lemon and
not strangling a human being. Thus, no intent to kill....
...However, evidence of mental disease or defect does not
necessarily preclude the defendant from possessing the requisite inthe
tent. A defendant can be both insane and capable of having
39
requisite intent; the two concepts are not mutually exclusive.
Rosen proceeds to give examples of five cases in which replacing
the affirmative defense of insanity with the mens rea approach would
be outcome-determinative:
In case one, the defendant believed that the devil was in his daughter. After stabbing her over one hundred and fifty times with a pair
of scissors, he proceeded to gouge out her eyes. In case two, the
defendant extracted all of her three year old daughter's teeth because she believed that the devil was inside of them. In case three,
the defendant threw his baby from a first floor window in order to
save him from being attacked by some assailants who did not exist.
The defendant in case four cut off the tip of his young son's penis
See Buitendorp, supra note 34, at 968 n.10.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (Michie 1997 & 2001 Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1161 (West Supp. 2000-2001); Commonwealth v. Keita, 699 N.E.2d 1243, 1244 n.1
(Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (following the approach in Commonwealth v. McHoul 226 N.E.2d 556
(Mass. 1967), in permitting defendant to assert an insanity defense).
38 See supra note 25.
39
Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1999, at 253, 261 (footnote omitted).
36

37
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while suffering delusions relating to "black magic." Finally, the defendant in case five attempted to kill his parents because he believed that they were going to be tortured, and he wanted to kill
40
them first to insure that they would die in a humane way.

Obviously, each of the aforementioned defendants suffered from
some mental abnormality. If proved to the satisfaction of a jury,
under the extrinsic insanity defense these defendants would be (and
were in fact 41 ) successful in obtaining a verdict of NGRI. However,

under the mens rea approach, they would all have been found
guilty. 4 2 The defendant in case two, for example, knew she was extracting her daughter's teeth, and she possessed the intent to do just

that. The fact that she thought the devil was inside of them is irrelevant under the mens rea approach.

To say only that some insane defendants 4 3 will be unable to prevail under the mens rea approach greatly understates the impact of
this reform. Indeed, Rosen notes that "even the most debilitating

mental illness rarely negates the appropriate mental state." 44 According to Professor Mandiberg, this is because "in very few individuals will
reality perception be so impaired as to prevent accurate processing of
data from the surrounding world. Few defendants will be able to show
a disability that is logically relevant to the required subjective mental
'45
state.

41

Id. at 261-62.
See id. at 262.

42

See id.

40

43 I use the term "insane defendants" to mean those defendants who would theoretically have a one-hundred percent chance of being found NGRI in a jurisdiction with an
extrinsic insanity test. In other words, when the term "insane person" is mentioned in this
Note, I will assume that both the prosecution and defense would have stipulated to the
requirements of legal insanity in a jurisdiction with an extrinsic insanity defense.
44 Rosen, supra note 39, at 261.
45 Mandiberg, supra note 21, at 263 n.192; see also United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d
889, 900 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that "[o]nly in the rare case, however, will even a legally
insane defendant actually lack the requisite mens rea purely because of mental defect,"
and quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-577, at 15 n.23 (1983), which concluded that "[m]ental
illness rarely, if ever, renders a person incapable of understanding what he or she is doing"
and "does not, for example, alter the perception of shooting a person to that of shooting a
tree"); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 374 (Utah 1995) ("As to crimes requiring intent, an
insane person will virtually always have the mental state required by the law . . . even
though the defendant suffers from severe mental derangement, such as an extreme and
bizarre psychotic delusion."). A study analyzing the effects of Montana's adoption of the
mens rea approach strongly corroborates these assertions. While the success rate of Montana's extrinsic insanity defense was already declining in the years prior to its 1979 reform,
there was a much more sudden and drastic diminution following the reform. See
STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 128. Specifically,
In the 6 years after the reform, only five people in the seven study counties
[out of the 466 who raised the lack-of-mens-rea issue in their defense-an
incidence of approximately one percent] were successfully acquitted due to
their mental state at the time of the crime ....
Three of the acquittals
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It is important to note that the preceding examples all refer to
crimes in which the prosecution was required to prove subjective in46
tent, such as purpose, knowledge, and, in some cases, recklessness.
In such cases, while the insane defendant will rarely prevail under the
mens rea approach, it does occasionally happen, and one could certainly conceive of scenarios in which an insane defendant might successfully raise a negativing insanity defense. However, when an
objective mental state (such as negligence) or no mental state (i.e.,
strict liability) applies to the prohibited conduct, the results of a
switch to the mens rea approach are far more draconian. In such
cases, absolutely no insane defendant could successfully raise a negativing insanity defense under any set of circumstances. 47 Indeed, "[i]f
the prosecution can convict merely on proof of objective culpability
• . . , mental abnormality... will be irrelevant." 48 The reasoning behind such a conclusion is relatively straightforward. As illustrated
occurred within the first year following the reform and may have been tried
under the old law.
Id. at 128-29.
In her article, Professor Mandiberg discusses how one might negative the mens rea
46
of recklessness, though she does so in the context of a defendant's intoxication, see
Mandiberg, supra note 21, at 223, which is not relevant for the purposes of this Note.
However, looking at Professor Mandiberg's explanation in the context of mental abnormality instead of intoxication does not alter her general framework. She notes that
whether one can negative recklessness depends essentially on how the jurisdiction defines
the term. See id. at 261 n.184. If recklessness is used in its purely objective sense, meaning
that the prosecution must prove only carelessness about any aspect of the defendant's behavior, then the defendant will not be successful, because mental abnormality cannot negative an objective mens rea. Id. On the other hand, if recklessness is used as the Model
Penal Code defines the term, then the defendant has a much greater chance of success.
Section 2.02(2) (c) of the Model Penal Code defines recklessness as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (1985). From this definition, establishing recklessness
requires proof of both an objective and subjective element. First, there must exist a "substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from [the defendant's] conduct." Id. Whether the risk is "substantial" is the objective element. See id.
However, the prosecution must also establish that the defendant "consciously disregarded"
this risk, which is a subjective element. Therefore, if a defendant's mental abnormality
precluded him from consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk, he would
prevail under the mens rea approach.
47 Cf State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 374-75 (Utah 1995) (Stewart,J., dissenting) ("As
to nonintentional crimes... an insane defendant is held strictly liable for doing the act
because he cannot, by definition, show that he acted as a reasonable person would have
acted-the standard objective test employed in such cases."); Mandiberg, supra note 21, at
228 (noting that "mental abnormality... can be [a] negativing defense[ I] only to subjective mental state requirements").
48 Mandiberg, supra note 21, at 228.
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above, the concept of insanity is broader than the concept of mens
rea; 49 therefore, all defendants who could prevail under a negativing

insanity defense could also prevail under an extrinsic insanity defense,
but only a small fraction of those prevailing under an extrinsic insanity defense could also prevail under a negativing insanity defense.
In cases where strict liability is at issue, the determination of insanity
under an extrinsic defense is a separate inquiry, and would occur after
stipulating to the elements of the offense. Thus, a defendant could,
in theory, commit a strict liability crime, yet still be exculpated under
an extrinsic insanity defense. 50 However, when evidence of mental
abnormality may be used only to negative mens rea, a defendant
would always be unsuccessful in doing so because a strict liability
crime, by definition, contains no mens rea for the defendant to negative. Similarly, in crimes requiring objective culpability, the defendant
will never be able to show that he acted as a reasonable person would
have, because the reasonable person does not suffer from a mental
abnormality. 51 Clearly, then, the switch to the mens rea approach is
hardly a matter of semantics-it effectively precludes almost all insane
52
defendants from exculpation on the basis of mental abnormality.
49
1 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 18, § 4.1(b), at 429 (quoting Frederica B. Koller,
Note, The Insanity Defense: The Need for Articulate Goals at the Acquittal, Commitment, and Release

Stages, 112 U. PA. L. Riv. 733, 734 (1964)).
50
Some commentators, however, have argued that insanity should not be a defense to
strict liability offenses, especially those considered "public welfare offenses," such as traffic
violations. See, e.g., Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 78
(1933) (arguing that this approach is justified by the light penalties imposed for such
infractions).
51
Professor Mandiberg makes this point all the more apparent:
Assume the jury believes that the defendant shot a human being with a gun
and also that the defendant was delusional and thought he was shooting a
bear. If the prosecutor must prove that the defendant was aware his target
was human (subjective mental state) the prosecutor will fail, as the delusion
will negative the element. But if the prosecutor merely has to prove that a
reasonable person would have been aware that the target was human (objective mental state) the prosecutor will succeed. Since the standard is not
"the reasonable delusional person," the cause of the defendant's failure to
perceive the nature of his target is irrelevant.
...
In other words, the objective approach does not assume that the
defendant is a reasonable person; it merely indicates that society will demand that he act like one. If he does not, for whatever reasons, he must
bear the consequences.
Mandiberg, supra note 21, at 262-63 (footnote omitted).
52
One question I seek to answer in this Note, then, is whether such a result is constitutionally permissible. In other words, the question becomes whether it is a constitutional
minimum that an extrinsic insanity defense be available, regardless of whether or not the
option of a negativing insanity defense is available. If this is so, then allowing a negativing
insanity defense to be the only medium available to the defendant by which to introduce
evidence of mental abnormality (i.e., the mens rea approach) would be constitutionally
inadequate. See infra Part III.A (discussing due process analysis in the insanity defense
context).
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II
ABOLITION IN THE COURTS:

A

REVIEW OF THE CASES

As one might guess, it was not long after the adoption of the
mens rea approach in the above-mentioned states that convicted defendants challenged these statutes as unconstitutional. This Part explores three main cases dealing with such challenges. 53 The first case,
State v. Searcy,54 pertained to Fourteenth Amendment due process,
while in the second case, State v. Cowan,55 the defendant raised a different due process issue, as well as a cruel and unusual punishment
argument. In the final case, State v. Herrera,56 the court addressed
questions of due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and equal
protection.
A.

Idaho-State v. Searcy

In State v. Searcy,57 a 1990 case, the Idaho Supreme Court was
called upon to decide the constitutionality of the mens rea approach.
1. Facts, ProceduralPosture, and Majority Opinion
On July 15, 1987, Barry Searcy shot and killed Teresa Rice while
robbing Jack's Grocery Store in Ashton, Idaho. 58 At trial, Searcy
presented psychiatric testimony indicating that he had been suffering
from a mental disease called "cocainism." 59 The judge, following
Idaho Code section 18-207, admitted the testimony but instructed the
jury to consider it only in determining whether Searcy possessed the
requisite mens rea-that is to say, whether he possessed criminal intent.60 The jury found Searcy guilty of first-degree murder. 61 On ap53 In many of the following cases, the defendants challenged their respective state
statutes as violative of both the federal Constitution and their state constitutions. While
these state constitutional claims will be mentioned where appropriate, the focus of this
Note, as well as the analysis in Part III, infra, will be in regard to federal constitutional
implications. Additionally, because of the substantive similarity of the various state statutes,
I will not examine them closely.
54 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990).
55 861 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1993).
56 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995).
57 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990). As of yet, no federal circuit court has squarely addressed this question. However, in 1994, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a Montana case dealing with the issue. SeeState v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1993), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1105 (1994). See infra Part II.B for a discussion of Cowan.
58 Searcy, 798 P.2d at 915.
59 Recent Developments, supra note 15, at 1133 (citing Brief of Appellant at 17, Searcy
(No. 17835)).
60 Id. Section 18-207 provides, in relevant part, that "Mental condition shall not be a
defense to any charge of criminal conduct. ... Nothing herein is intended to prevent the
admission of expert evidence on the issue of any state of mind which is an element of the
offense, subject to the rules of evidence." IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a), (c) (Michie 1997).
61
Searzy, 798 P.2d at 916.
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peal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Searcy argued that section 18-207
denied him due process of law "because it prevented him from pleading insanity as a defense. ' 62 ChiefJustice Bakes, writing for the court,
rejected Searcy's argument. 63 One commentator later observed:
[D]rawing guidance from various Supreme Court opinions, the
court declined to establish any constitutional rule compelling the
availability of the insanity defense. Specifically, the court understood Powell v. Texas to recognize the insanity defense as having no
constitutional definition and as therefore subject to different interpretations by the states. In addition, the court explained that Leland
v. Oregon gave the states broad discretion in determining the burden of proof to impose on defendants raising the insanity defense.
Finally, the court found reassurance in then-Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Ake v. Oklahoma that "[i]t is highly doubtful that
due process requires a State to make available an insanity defense to
a criminal defendant."

64

The court also gave weight to State v. Korell,65 a Montana Supreme
Court case that upheld a similar mens rea approach statute. 66 Here,
much like in Korell, the court distinguished this type of statutory
scheme from the three early abolition attempts that were struck down
for excluding all evidence of mental condition. 67 Because evidence of
mental condition may still be admissible into evidence under the
Idaho and Montana statutory schemes (though not as part of an extrinsic defense), the court held that it satisfied the requirements of
68
due process.
2. Justice McDevitt's Dissent
In a lengthy and thoroughly researched dissent, Justice McDevitt
concluded that Idaho's statutory scheme violated Fourteenth Amend62

Id.

See id. at 919.
Recent Developments, supra note 15, at 1133-34 (footnotes omitted); Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68 (1985).
65
690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984).
66
See Searcy, 798 P.2d at 918.
67 Recent Developments, supra note 15, at 1134.
68 As will be discussed infra at Part III.A, by holding that due process is not violated,
the court implicitly determined that the insanity defense is neither "one of the 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,'" Searcy, 798 P.2d at 916 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)),
nor is "so deeply rooted in our legal traditions as to be considered fundamental and thus
embedded in due process." Id. However accurate (or inaccurate) this proposition might
be, the court nevertheless seems to have skirted the issue. At the outset of its analysis, it
mentioned the relevant due process standard, but went no further in addressing it, save for
the statement that the defense "has had a long and varied history during its development
in the common law." Id. at 917.
63

64
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ment due process guarantees. 69 According to one commentator, 'Justice McDevitt rejected the majority's conclusion that authority for
repeal of the insanity defense could be found between the lines of
United States Supreme Court opinions [cited by the majority] ."70 Justice McDevitt criticized the majority for its "unjustifiably broad leaps
of reasoning,"'71 arguing that simply because the Supreme Court,
through Leland v. Oregon72 and Powell v. Texas,73 has given states flexibility in developing their insanity defense standards and procedures, it
does not logically follow that they may abolish the defense entirely. 74
He then determined, through an exhaustive historical analysis, that
the insanity defense "has an independent existence [apart from the
concept of mens rea] of sufficient duration and significance to entitle
it to a place in our American concept of 'ordered liberty.' ' 7 5 In fact,
he argued, treating the insanity defense as nonfundamental would be
inconsistent with the underlying principles of Peny v. Lynaugh76 as
well as those of Leland.7 7 Thus, according to Justice McDevitt, FourSee id. at 922-35 (dissenting opinion).
Brian E. Elkins, Idaho's Repeal of the Insanity Defense: Mhat Are We Trying to Provei, 31
IDAHO L. REv. 151, 156-57 (1994).
71
Recent Developments, supra note 15, at 1134.
72
343 U.S. 790 (1952).
73 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
74
Recent Developments, supra note 15, at 1134.
75 State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 927 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting). The
insanity defense is separate from the concept of mens rea, according to Justice McDevitt,
because "[wi]hile mens reais concerned with the guilty mind, the defense of insanity questions whether the guilty mind with which the act is done is a product of voluntary and
rational choice." Id. at 935 (McDevitt, J., dissenting).
76 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
77
See Searcy, 798 P.2d at 934-35 (McDevitt, J., dissenting) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)). As Justice McDevitt
reasoned:
In Penry, the issue was whether the Eighth Amendment rule against cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded
defendant. ... [T]he Court ultimately concluded that there was no bar to
the execution of Penry. The central rationale was that there were other
screening mechanisms in place in the criminal justice system which would
measure the mental competence and related culpability of the accused.
The Court reasoned that "[b]ecause of the protections afforded by the insanity defense today, such a person is not likely to be convicted or face the
prospect of punishment." . . . The rule of Peny cannot apply in jurisdictions that lack an insanity defense; otherwise there would exist the danger
of imposing capital punishment against the mentally incompetent, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 934 (McDevitt, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In regard to Leland,Justice McDev69
70

itt asserted:

That case, in conjunction with the holdings of In re Winship [397 U.S. 358
(1970)] and Martin v. Ohio [480 U.S. 228 (1987)].... establish[es] that the
issues of mens rea and insanity are not one and the same.
As noted previously, the United States Supreme Court in Winship held
that due process requires the prosecution to prove every element of the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. However, that holding would
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teenth Amendment due process requires the availability of an extrinsic insanity defense, regardless of whether a negativing insanity
defense is available.
B.

Montana-State v. Cowan

State v. Cowan,78 probably the most cited and well-known opinion
standing for the proposition that the abolition of the insanity defense
is not unconstitutional, 7 9 was the next case in which the constitutionality of the mens rea approach reached a state's highest court.
1. Facts, ProceduralPosture, and Majority Opinion
On April 23 or 24, 1990,Joe Cowan broke into a cabin at the Lolo
Work Center near Lolo, Montana which served as the living quarters
for Margaret Doherty, a United Sates Forest Service employee.8 0
When Doherty came home and discovered that someone had been
inside the cabin watching television, eating, and "generally making
himself at home," she immediately locked the doors and called the
police. 8 ' While on the phone with the police, "Doherty saw Cowan
circling the cabin trying to gain entrance. He called Doherty a 'society bitch' and a 'mechanic robot bitch,' and he yelled 'it's my house'
and other unintelligible statements. Cowan also kicked at Doherty's
car and pulled at her license plates. '82 Using a hodag (a sharp treeplanting tool), Cowan again broke into the cabin. 8 3 Doherty pointed
not apply to affirmative defenses, as they are not considered to be an element of the crime.... In Leland, the Court characterized the issue of insanity as a defense in the course of holding that the burden of proof to
prove insanity could be placed on the defendant....
Under the rule [ ] enunciated in [ Winship], if the insanity defense is no
more than an issue of whether the defendant entertained the necessary
mens rea to commit the crime, then the holding of Leland must fall, and the
prosecution must bear the burden of proving the sanity of every defendant.
For Lelandand Winship to exist in harmony under such an interpretation, it
would have to be concluded that the state could define all crimes in such a
way as to eliminate the requirement of mens rea as an element of the crime,
characterize a lack of intent as an affirmative defense, and thus shift the
burden of proof to the defense to prove that there was no intent to commit
the act charged. It is my belief that such a reading of the Supreme Court's
holdings in this area is too strained to merit serious consideration.
Id. at 934-35 (McDevitt, J., dissenting).
78 861 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994).
79 The notoriety of the Cowan decision likely results from the Supreme Court's subsequent denial of certiorari, which was characterized by many as the Court's tacit approval of
Cowan. For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part II.B.3.
80
861 P.2d at 885; see Stephanie C. Stimpson, Note, State v. Cowan: The Consequences of
Montana's Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 55 MoNT.L. REv. 503, 513 (1994).
81
Cowan, 861 P.2d at 885.
82
Stimpson, supra note 80, at 513 (footnotes omitted) (citing Petitioner's Brief at 4,
Cowan (No. 93-1264); Cowan, 861 P.2d at 890 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting)).
83
Stimpson, supra note 80, at 513-14.
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a gun at him, and when he came toward her, she shot the gun, but it
misfired. 84 Cowan proceeded to attack Doherty with the hodag, striking her numerous times on the head, arms, and shoulders.8 5 The
sheriff's deputies responding to the call found Cowan outside of the
nearby mess hall, where he surrendered without incident.8 6 Doherty
was found in a semi-conscious state, and she survived, "despite injuries
including a punctured lung, broken ribs, a broken scapula, a dislo87
cated shoulder, and a skull fracture.
Prior to trial, Cowan was diagnosed with paranoid schizophreWhile all three mental health experts that testified at trial-one
psychiatrist and two clinical psychologists-concluded that the disease
likely precluded Cowan from appreciating the criminality of his conduct at the time of the crime,8 9 they also determined that he could
satisfy Montana's requisite mental state because notwithstanding his
delusions, he could act with purpose and knowledge. 90 He was found
competent to stand trial and subsequently was convicted. 9 1 During
the trial, defense counsel filed a memorandum challenging Montana's statutory scheme as violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, arguing that these protections guaranteed the right to consideration of an acquittal based on
the insanity defense. 9 2 On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court,
Cowan raised two issues relevant to this Note: (1) whether due process
was violated because Montana's statutory scheme establishes a conclusive presumption of criminal intent in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana,93 and (2) whether "sentencing and confining Cowan to prison
nia.88

84

Id. at 514.

85

Id. at 513-14.

Id.
87
Cowan, 861 P.2d at 885.
88 Stimpson, supra note 80, at 514.
89 Cowan, 861 P.2d at 891-92 (TrieweilerJ., dissenting). Indeed, this lack of appreciation was even conceded by the state's psychologist, and "[t]here was no testimony from
any witness to controvert the expert medical opinion that, because of serious mental disease, defendant was unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time that he
assaulted his victim." Id. at 892 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 891-92 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
86

91

Id. at 885.
Stimpson, supra note 80, at 515. Presumably, the trial court rejected these
arguments.
93 Cowan, 861 P.2d at 885 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)). Sandstrom held that the Due Process Clause "prohibits the use of a [mandatory] presumption
which relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving mental state by requiring an inference of the existence of criminal intent from the fact of criminal conduct." Id. at 888. For
example, as was the case in Sandstrom, ajury instruction providing that "'a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts'" would be impermissible. Id.
92
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violate [s] the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments... because of his
94
mental condition."
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Turnage quickly disposed
of these arguments. Regarding due process, the court first noted that,
because Cowan had received a bench trial, there were no jury instructions. 95 However, Cowan asserted that Sandstrom would still apply if
the trial judge relied on Montana statutes that created a conclusive
presumption of mental state. 96 Specifically, he alleged that, because a
"mental disease or defect does not... constitute a valid defense to a
criminal charge in Montana, a conclusive presumption is established
as to mental state in violation of... Sandstrom.''9 7 Further, because
Montana law provided that knowledge or purpose may be inferred
from evidence of organized or integrated conduct, 98 Cowan claimed
that "no one who commits a criminal act can ever be acquitted on
grounds of insanity because it would be impossible for anyone to
cause harm without engaging in a minimal level of organized conduct."99 Chief Justice Turnage responded by relying on State v. Koreli'00 and Leland to hold that the Due Process Clause does not require
the use of any particular insanity test or allocation of burden of
proof.10 1 Next, he concluded that the plain language of the Montana
statutes at issue merely establishes a permissive inference, not a conclusive presumption, because it states that conduct "may" suffice to
establish criminal intent, and thus leaves the ultimate determination
to the trier of fact. 10 2 Such permissive inferences, he commented, do
not violate the Sandstrom rule. 103

94 Id. at 885. It is likely that Cowan did not raise a "fundamental principle of liberty
and justice" argument under his due process challenge because the Montana Supreme
Court had already decided that issue in State v. Korel see supra note 65 and accompanying
text, and was likely not willing to reconsider it.
95 See Cowan, 861 P.3d at 888.
96 Id. The court did not seem to disagree with this contention.
97 Id. This argument is relatively weak, however, as mens rea approach statutes do
not, by their nature, establish any presumption of mens rea; rather, they explicitly leave the
determination of mens rea to the trier of fact. ChiefJustice Tumage probably recognized
the same weakness in this argument, for he did not even address it in the majority opinion.
98 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-112 (2001) ("In a deliberate homicide, knowledge or
purpose may be inferred from the fact that the accused committed a homicide and no
circumstances of mitigation, excuse, or justification appear.").
99
Cowan, 861 P.2d at 888.
100
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
101 Cowan, 861 P.2d at 888 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)). This part
of the opinion was probably unnecessary, as it was not part of the due process challenge
mounted by Cowan. The court may have included this dictum simply to reaffirm its commitment to the constitutionality of Montana's statutory scheme.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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As for Cowan's cruel and unusual punishment challenge, 0 4 the
court noted that the Montana legislature "has acted to assure that the
attendant stigma of a criminal conviction is mitigated by the sentencing judge's personal consideration of the defendant's mental condition and provision for commitment to an appropriate institution for
treatment, as an alternative to a sentence of imprisonment."'1 5 Additionally, it stated that
Cowan was not sentenced to prison, but was placed in the custody of
the Department of Institutions. The [trial] court specifically stated
its purpose to provide for treatment of Cowan's mental illness at a
different facility if the Director of the Department of Institutions
determines [that] treatment at a different facility is needed. 10 6
Taken together, the court determined these safeguards protected
10 7
Cowan from being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.
2. Justice Trieweiler'sDissent
Justice Trieweiler, in a lengthy dissent joined by Justice Hunt,
noted that the facts of Cowan present "the worst case scenario anticipated by national critics of Montana's insanity laws"' 0 8 and was a clear
example of how Montana's statutory scheme "inadequately and unconstitutionally addresses mentally ill defendants." 10 9 In arriving at
this conclusion, Justice Trieweiler criticized the majority's reliance on
Korell because of its misinterpretation of Leland, agreeing instead with
the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in People v. Skinner,"l0
which deduced an interpretation of Leland opposite to the majority's
in Cowan and Korel 1 1
104
Specifically, Cowvan argued that punishing the insane constitutes inhumane treatment, and that considering a defendant's insanity only for the purpose of reducing the
degree of the crime or determining the punishment for the crime qualifies as cruel and
unusual punishment and a violation of due process-presumably because considering the
defendant's insanity in a determination of guilt constitutes a fundamental aspect of due
process. See id. Much of this particular challenge seems grounded in the type of due process reasoning found in Searcy and KorelL See supraPart lA.L. While this Nwas probably not
the best framework in which to argue this type of Eighth Amendment challenge, Cowan
may have been trying to dress a wolf in sheep's clothing, disguising a due process argument
as one based upon cruel and unusual punishment. If this indeed was his intention, the
court certainly was not fooled.
105
Cowan, 861 P.2d at 889 (quoting State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1002 (1952)).
106
Id.
107 See id.
108

Id. at 892 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).

Stimpson, supra note 80, at 519 (characterizing Justice Trieweiler's dissenting
opinion).
110 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985).
111 Specifically, Justice Trieweiler noted:
In Leland v. Oregon, the [C ourt ... affirmed the right of the state to formulate the applicable test of legal insanity. In so doing, however, the [C] ourt
measured the law under due process standards, concluding that the irresis109
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Trieweiler also determined that Montana's statutory scheme inadequately protects mentally ill defendants, embracing the view of the
California Supreme Court in People v. Coleman,1 12 which professed that
"[o]bviously an insane person accused of a crime would be inhumanely dealt with if his insanity were considered merely to reduce the
degree of his crime or the punishment therefor." 113 For a statutory
scheme to be constitutional, Justice Trieweiler asserted, a court or jury
must be able to consider whether a defendant could cognitively understand the criminality of his conduct or be able to conform his conduct to abide by the law.11 4 Montana's statutory scheme, he argued,
"does exactly what the California Supreme Court suggests would violate due process and cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the
115
Constitution."
Finally, quoting Justice McDevitt's dissent in Searcy, 116 Justice
Trieweiler explained that the insanity defense is implicit in the American concept of ordered liberty,1 17 a proposition that later commentators have observed is "evidenced by historical precedence and its
nearly universal acceptance in American jurisdictions." 1 8
3.

Subsequent History: Denial of Certiorariby the Supreme Court

In February 1994, Cowan petitioned the United States Supreme
120
Court for a writ of certiorari. 1 9 The petition, however, was denied.
A denial of certiorari carries no precedent; "[n]onetheless," as one
commentator described, "several newspapers characterized this denial
of certiorari.., as a 'green light' for state legislatures to abolish their
insanity defenses. Victims' rights advocates considered the denial of
certiorari a victory. Legal authorities interpreted the Supreme
Court's action as easing the way for abolition of the insanity
12
defense." 1
tible impulse extension of [the] traditional [extrinsic] insanity test was not
"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" The court thus seemingly
accepted the proposition that the [extrinsic] insanity defense, in some formulation, is required by due process.
Cowan, 861 P.2d at 890 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952)).
112
126 P.2d 349 (Cal. 1942).
113

Id. at 353.

114 See Cowan, 861 P.2d at 890 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
116 See supra Part II.A.2.
117 See Cowan, 861 P.2d at 893 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
118 Stimpson, supra note 80, at 519-20 (characterizing Justice Trieweiler's dissenting
opinion in Cowan, 861 P.2d at 893-94).
119 See 62 U.S.L.W. 3629 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1264).
120 See Cowan v. Montana, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994).
121
Buitendorp, supra note 34, at 969-70 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Bob Hohler,
Curb on Plea of Insanity Is Let Stand, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1994, at I ("The court, in
bypassing the thorny issue without comment, may have eased the way for other states to
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These groups may be counting their chickens before they hatch,
though, as a denial of certiorari can occur for a number of reasons.
As Justice Frankfurter explained,
[a] variety of considerations underlie denials ....

and as to the

same petition different reasons may lead different Justices to the
same result. This is especially true of petitions for review on writ of
certiorari to a State court. Narrowly technical reasons may lead to
denials.... A decision may satisfy all these technical requirements
and yet may commend itself for review to fewer than four members
of the Court. Pertinent considerations ofjudicial policy here come
into play. A case may raise an important question but the record
may be cloudy. It may be desirable to have different aspects of an
issue further illuminated by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has
122
its own time for ripening.
Yet, at the same time, it seems that the facts of Cowan would have
made it the "poster child" case for the granting of a writ, which could
lead one to believe that the Supreme Court is satisfied with the Montana Supreme Court's opinion and rationale after all. 123 Alternatively,
though, they might just be waiting for a conflicting decision in another state court or in a federal habeas corpus action before they believe the issue is ripe for review. Nevertheless, it is dangerous to draw
any conclusions from a denial of certiorari, and therefore only time
will tell whether-or, more likely, when-the Court will grapple with
this question in the future.
C.

Utah-State v. Herrera

Utah is the most recent state to encounter a challenge to its mens
rea approach statute. In State v. Herrera,124 the Utah Supreme Court
was presented with a flurry of constitutional claims, including many
previously discussed, but with an additional challenge: Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection.
1. Facts and ProceduralPosture
Herrera presented itself to the court as a consolidation of two
cases on interlocutory appeal, State v. Herreraand State v. Sweezey, both
of which contested the constitutionality of Utah's mens rea approach
follow Montana's lead in outlawing the controversial defense method, according to legal
authorities on both sides of the debate."); David G. Savage, High Court Action Puts Insanity
Defense in Peri4 L.A. TimEs, Mar. 29, 1994, at A23 ("The Supreme Court on Monday gave
states a green light to abolish the traditional insanity defense by declining to review the
assault conviction of a schizophrenic Montana man.").
122 Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-18 (1950).
Cf Peter Linzer, The Meaning of CertiorariDenials, 79 COLuM. L. Ray. 1227, 1304
123
(1979) ("Many times [the denial of certiorari] gives us a glimpse, imperfect to be sure, into
the Justices' preliminary attitudes on a given issue.").
895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995).
124
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statute.1 2 5 Therefore, the facts involved in each case, as far as this
appeal was concerned, were quite limited. In Herrera,the defendant
was charged with shooting and killing Claudia Martinez, his ex-girlfriend. 126 He told the police that he had been visiting "'some girl"'
when "'something snapped, something happened to him and he decided to go to the Martinez house and shoot Claudia.' ' 127 Herrera
did so, shooting her twice in the head. 128 He then chased Martinez's
mother into a bedroom where Martinez's brother was sleeping.1 2 9 He
shot at both of them, but missed.13 0 The police then arrived at Martinez's house and arrested Herrera while he was still in possession of
the gun. 1 31 He was charged with Martinez's murder and two counts of
attempted murder, to which he pled NGRI. 13 2 Herrera then filed a
number of motions "attacking Utah's statutory scheme as unconstitutional." 133 After Salt Lake County District Court Judge John Rokich
dismissed these motions, Herrera petitioned for an interlocutory
order.134
In Sweezey, Mikell Sweezey approached another man, Steve Matthews, outside a hotel in downtown Salt Lake City, pulled a gun from
his backpack, and shot Matthews in the face from a distance of about
eight feet.135 According to the court, " [t]he bullet entered Matthews's
left cheek, but did not kill him. A security officer of the hotel heard
Sweezey say, 'They wrecked my home so I shot him.' 1 3 6 Sweezey was
charged with the attempted murder of Matthews, to which he pled
NGRI. Like Herrera, Sweezey filed a number of motions challenging
unsuccessfully Utah's insanity defense statutes, then petitioned for an
137
interlocutory order.
2.

13 s

Majority Opinion

The majority began its equal protection discussion by noting that
the federal constitution requires that "similarly situated individuals be
125
126

See id. at 361.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
'33
Id.
134 Id.; see also Catherine E. Lilly, Recent Development, State v. Herrera: The Utah Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Utah's ControversialInsanity Defense Statute, 22J. CONTEMP. L. 221
(1996) (providing a case discussion of Herrera).
135 Herrera, 895 P.2d at 361.
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 The majority opinion discusses due process, equal protection, and cruel and
unusual punishment issues. Because this Note has already discussed how the Searcy and
127

128
129
130
131
132
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treated alike unless there is a reasonable basis for treating them differently."' 3 9 The defendants in Herreraargued that Utah's mens rea approach "illegally differentiates between mentally ill defendants solely
on the content of their delusions.' 40 In other words, given two defendants who both are mentally ill and suffer from the same mental
disease or defect, suppose one kills under the delusion that he is killing something that is not human, while the other kills under the delusion that he is being attacked and that his actions are justified as selfdefense. The mens rea model precludes conviction of the former, but
not the latter. According to the defendants, "each is equally mentally
ill, but they are treated differently because some 'clinically indistinguishable delusional system' causes them to have different
hallucinations."'

41

The majority did not find this argument compelling, reasoning
that the legislature had a rational basis for the differential treatment
in that it was "draw[ing] a line between those who do not comprehend that they are taking a human life and those who do."' 4 2 The
first type of mentally ill offender, the court explained, does not know
that he is hurting or killing another person and thus makes no moral
judgment. 143 Conversely, the second offender does know he is hurting or killing another person, and therefore is aware that his actions
may be criminal. 144 Citing an American Medical Association (AMA)
report, 14 5 the court decided:
It can reasonably be concluded that those who understand and appreciate the fact that they are killing another are more "culpable"
than those whose delusions carry them even further away from reality.... The mens rea model is a legitimate means to the end of
Cowan courts addressed due process challenges, see supra Part II.A-B, and because the
Herera due process analysis does not differ greatly in substance, that issue will not be
addressed here. The majority did not reach the cruel and unusual punishment challenge
because of the appeal's interlocutory status. See Herrera, 895 P.2d at 371. Neither
defendant had been convicted or sentenced, nor had there been an adjudication of their
respective mental states. Id. Thus, the issue was deemed unripe for review, see id., and
although the dissent disagreed with this determination, I will not discuss it here (though
the dissent's cruel and unusual punishment analysis will be referenced infra at Part III.C).
Instead, I will presently focus only on the equal protection issue.
139 Herrera, 895 P.2d at 368. Presumably, the court was referring to rational basis review, which is the test for non-suspect classifications under the Constitution. If the classification is semi-suspect or suspect, a higher standard applies in order for the differential
treatment to pass constitutional muster. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
140
Henrera, 895 P.2d at 368.
141

Id.

Id. at 368-69.
Id. at 369.
Id.
See Committee Report, Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials & Limitations of Psychiatric
Testimony, JAMA 2967 (June 1984).
142

143
144
145
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holding responsible those persons who acted with the necessary
46
intent. 1
3.

Associate Chiefjustice Stewart's Dissent

In a somewhat rhetorical dissent and otiose dissent, Associate
Chief Justice Stewart claimed that the identical treatment of two
clearly dissimilarly situated groups-sane and insane persons-under
Utah's statutory scheme, as well as its discrimination based upon the
content of delusions of the latter group, is "patently irrational and
invidious. It serves no rational purpose. It has no rational connection
to the protection of the public, which historically has been accomplished by civil confinement .... [It] is vacuous. It is capricious and
arbitrary... irrational and invidiously discriminatory."' 4 7 He argued
that a person who is so insane as to believe that he is actually squeezing a grapefruit rather than a human being is just as "dangerous to
society as one who kills in the delusional belief that he is acting in selfdefense. 1 48 Further, Associate Chief Justice Stewart contended that
an insane person who kills under a delusion that, if real, would render
the killing self-defense and therefore justified, would be punished
"simply for being insane, not for the act. That is not only a denial of
equal protection, but also the infliction of cruel and unusual
1 49
punishment."
Finally, Associate Chief Justice Stewart analogized the rationale
behind the insanity defense to the law against punishing children of a
very young age who cannot discern between right and wrong:
A four-year-old who points a loaded gun, pulls the trigger, and kills
another is not criminally punished because the law presumes that a
child does not understand the nature or wrongfulness of the act
due to his mental immaturity or incapacity. However, an insane
person who suffers from the same inability to understand either the
nature or the wrongfulness of his act is subject to punishment...
Herrera, 895 P.2d at 369.
Id. at 384-85 (Stewart, Assoc. C.J., dissenting).
148
See id. at 385 (Stewart, Assoc. C.J., dissenting).
149
Id. at 385 (Stewart, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). It is not clear from Associate Chief
Justice Stewart's opinion how this violates equal protection. Assuming, though, that this
particular assertion is true (i.e., that in this instance the punishment would be based only
upon a condition, not an act), it seems likely that the law would amount to a violation of
the Eighth Amendment. However, the underlying basis for such an assertion (presumably,
that the discrimination violates Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)) seems to stem
from an incorrect application of the Robinson principle, which compels the invalidation of
criminal laws that reach beyond concrete prescribed acts. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667
(holding that a state law "which imprisons a [narcotics addict] as a criminal, even though
he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular
behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
146

147
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not for culpable conduct, but for being insane, that is, for engaging
150
in conduct he would not have engaged in but for his insanity.
III
ABOLITION ON TRIAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Needless to say, the justices' differing opinions in the above cases
leave much room for discussion of the constitutional issues presented
by the abolition of the extrinsic insanity defense. This Part, by reference to the above cases as well as other constitutional doctrines, addresses the issues of due process, equal protection, and cruel and
unusual punishment.
A.

Due Process

Few phrases in the Constitution are more malleable than "due
There are numerous ways of phrasing the test that
process of law."''1
is used to determine whether due process has been violated. 152 Essentially, an infringement occurs when state action deprives an individual
of a procedure or right among those which are considered "'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions."1 5 3 If this formulation of the test is accurate, it seems that the dissenters in Searcy, Cowan, and Herreraare
more correct in their respective analyses.
In ascertaining whether the extrinsic defense of insanity meets
the "fundamental principle" test, court majorities are usually quick to
point out that the defense has not been uniform--rather, it has
changed over the years. For example, in Searcy, the court explained
that while "[t]he insanity defense has had a long and varied history
during its development in the common law," nevertheless, "[a] s the
150 Herrera,895 P.2d at 385 (Stewart, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). Justice Durham also filed
a separate dissent, in which Associate Chief Justice Stewart joined. Justice Durham began
his opinion by questioning the logic and reasoning of the AMA report the majority relied
upon. Id. at 389-90 (Durham, J., dissenting) (quoting from Stephen Morse's critique of
the AMA analysis in Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity DefenseReconsidered, 58
S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 791-92 (1985)); see supra note 145. In addition, he pointed out that
"the majority's 'second group' of killers makes no more of a 'moral judgment' than the
first. The whole point is that because of their mental condition, they are incapable of recognizing that any moral choice presents itself" Henrera, 895 P.2d at 390 (Durham, J., dissenting).
151 See U.S. CONsr. amend. V (stating, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall.., be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). The Due Process Clause
was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires
that "[n]o State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
152 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (noting the various ways the
Supreme Court has phrased the test).
153 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316 (1926)).
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understanding of the mental processes changed over the centuries,
1 54
the implications of a criminal defendant's insanity have changed."
However, what the majority opinions fail to recognize is that while the
insanity defense has not been uniform in its formulation over the
years (in that different jurisdictions have applied different tests, such
15 6
and Durham57
as the M'Naghten,'55 American Law Institute (ALI),
tests), every jurisdiction throughout the common law and in the history of this country (with the recent exceptions) has recognized insanity as an extrinsic defense and has used some form of an insanity
test or standard that recognizes it as such. 158 Indeed, the dissenters in
each of the opinions discussed in Part II explain at length the history
159
and treatment of the defense, tracing it back hundreds of years.
Certainly, this is weighty evidence that the extrinsic insanity defense
should qualify as "fundamental" for the purpose of extending due
process protection.
If the issue were to reach the United States Supreme Court, one
might argue that for the Court's reasoning to be consistent with that
of its prior cases, it must conclude that the insanity defense must be
made available as an extrinsic defense. For example, in Montana v.
Egelhoff,160 the Court stated that "[o]ur primary guide in determining
whether the principle in question is [a] fundamental [principle ofjustice] is, of course, historical practice.' 16' Quoting Hale, Blackstone,
and Coke, among others, Justice Scalia determined in Egelhoff that the
common law tradition did not allow a defendant to present evidence
of voluntary intoxication to negate the mens rea of a crime with which
he was charged. 16 2 Yet all of these same commentators, as well as myriad others, fell unequivocally on the side of the dissenters in Searcy,
State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 917 (Idaho 1990).
See supra note 21.
156
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985) ("A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law." (alteration in original)). For a discussion of the ALI "substantial capacity" test, see 1 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 18, § 4.3(d), at
462-64.
157
See supra note 28.
158
See GERBER, supra note 16, at 83 ("From the earliest common law, insanity in some
form has been either a partial or complete defense. [It] was firmly established by the time
the United States Constitution was adopted, and it has remained a fundamental part of
American criminal law since Revolutionary days.").
159
See Searcy, 798 P.2d at 927-35 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting); State v.
Cowan, 861 P.2d 884, 893-94 (Mont. 1993) (Trieweiler, J., dissenting); State v. Herrera,
895 P.2d 359, 374-76 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, Assoc. C.J., dissenting).
160 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
161
Id. at 43.
162 Id. at 44-45.
'54

155
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Cowan, and Herrera,and in the cases these opinions cited.' 63 Further,
while Scalia noted that a principle should have "the uniform and continuing acceptance one would expect for a rule that enjoys 'fundamental principle' status,"164 he certainly could not have meant this
literally to require that all states adopt the same exact principle and
standard for applying it (a contention the majorities in the Searcy and
Herreraopinions seem to believe165 ). If this were the case, it is likely
that very few, if any, principles would be considered fundamental.
1 66
To illustrate this point, consider that in Duncan v. Louisiana,
the Court held that because "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice," due process requires ajury
trial in all criminal cases. 167 Until and after that decision-indeed,
since sometime in the fourteenth century-a jury had been composed
exclusively of twelve citizens, and most states today continue to require that this number constitute a criminal jury. 6 8 However, in Williams v. Florida,169 the Court held that a jury may be comprised of as
few as six members without running afoul of the Constitution. 170 This
is, no doubt, a nonuniform application of the fundamental right to
trial byjury. However, it would be absurd to conclude that because of
the nonuniformity in its application, one can no longer consider the
right to a jury trial fundamental. Yet, this is exactly the reasoning the
majorities employed in Searcy and Herrera. Further, such a uniformity
requirement would certainly fly in the face of the well-established
right of the states to define and experiment with their criminal law
within the bounds of the Constitution' 7 '-aproposition with which more
conservative Justices, such as Scalia and Rehnquist, would likely
17 2
agree.
163
See, e.g., Searcy, 798 P.2d at 929 (McDevitt, J., dissenting) (relying on Hale); Sinclair
v. State, 132 So. 581, 583-84 (Miss. 1931) (Ethridge, J., concurring) (relying on Blackstone
and Sir Edward Coke).
164
Egelhoff 518 U.S. at 48.
165
See Searcy, 798 P.2d at 916-19; Herrera,895 P.2d at 365-66.
166
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
167
Id. at 149.
168
See 'Williamsv. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87-90 (1970) (discussing the history of the
common law's arrival at a twelve person jury); see also AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACrioNs AT LAW 75-76 (1922) ("At the beginning of thirteenth
century twelve was indeed the usual but not the invariable number. But by the middle of
the fourteenth century the requirement of twelve had probably become definitely fixed.
Indeed this number finally came to be regarded with something like superstitious reverence." (footnote omitted)).
169 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
170
See ad at 103.
171
See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 934 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting).
172 In Egelhoff the Court reiterated that:
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment
of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing
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Some might criticize this line of reasoning, however, on the
ground that requiring the right in question to be historically and traditionally protected as the sole factor in determining whether it should
be constitutionally protected allows "'personal and private notions'
[to] dictat[e] how that tradition is defined. It is then very likely that
the jurist will allow his or her personal morality to influence how to
define the tradition ....

[Therefore, this approach] serve[s] as an

illusory limitation on the judiciary.' 173 Such critics might instead advocate an approach in which tradition serves merely as one factor in
the overall calculus. 174 Indeed, in his dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.,175 Justice Brennan sharply criticized Justice Scalia's methodology
(which was the same as that employed in Egelhofj), labeling Scalia's
complete dependence on tradition as a "pretense," and arguing that
Scalia's methodology did not provide the objective boundaries it purported to set from the fact that "reasonable people can disagree about
the content of particular traditions." 1 76 Thus, Scalia's narrow interpretation may rightly be characterized as making the Due Process
Clause "a rigid doctrine unable to adapt to changes in society."' 177
Yet, even if Brennan's "totality of the circumstances" approach is
ultimately more suitable, the lengthy and consistent tradition behind
the insanity defense should figure prominently into this overall
calculus. Further, as Justice McDevitt noted in Searcy:
Another... test of whether a particular doctrine is "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" other than the history of the legal concept, is the unanimity with which the doctrine is adopted among
American jurisdictions. With the exception of... Montana (1979),
Idaho (1982) and Utah (1983), the insanity defense has been universally accepted in all American jurisdictions throughout this nation's history.... [A]s the Supreme Court has noted in the context
of judging "evolving standards of decency" under the Eighth

religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man.
This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of
the States.
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (plurality opinion)). While the Powell Court noted
in this passage that the "adjustment" of these doctrines may be appropriate, it is most likely
that the wholesale abolition of such critical principles would be unconstitutional as violative of due process. Insanity does not seem to distinguish itself as more or less important
than these other fundamental doctrines.
173

RobertJ. McManus, Note, Montana v. Egelhoff: Voluntary Intoxication, Morality, and

the Constitution, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1245, 1281 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
174

175
176
177

See id.
491 U.S. 110 (1989).
Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
McManus, supra note 173, at 1283.
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Amendment, such legislation is "an objective indicator of contem7
porary values upon which we can rely.'

This nearly unanimous acceptance of insanity as an extrinsic defense,
in one form or another, is further evidence that our contemporary
values have not changed dramatically from the basic principle that the
law cannot impose punishment where it cannot impose moral
blameworthiness.179
In sum, regardless of which method of constitutional interpretation one utilizes, considering both past tradition and the current state

of the law, one can arrive only at the conclusion that due process prohibits the elimination of the extrinsic insanity defense.

B. Equal Protection
As no commentator has yet spoken to the equal protection implications of the mens rea approach, this subpart attempts to comprehensively address the issue. In exploring how contemporary equal
protection theory and doctrine play out in the context of the mens rea
approach, it should become clear as to why the Herreracourt's equal
protection analysis is both incomplete as well as fundamentally
flawed-even if it ultimately arrived at the correct result.
The Herreracourt was the first court that purported to address the
issue of equal protection in regard to the mens rea approach. 8 0 However, the result of its endeavor was, to say the least, disappointing. In

both the majority and dissenting opinions, the justices' respective
178 State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 934 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting) (quoting
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989)). In addition to the jurisdictions noted in
Justice McDevitt's opinion, Kansas also has restricted the use of insanity as a separate affirmative defense. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
179
As the Court recognized in Morissette v. United States, "[h]istorically, our substantive
criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent
confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do
wrong." 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Roscoe
Pound, Introduction to FRANCIs Bowzs SAYRE, A SELEarION OF CASES ON CRIIiNAL LAWv, at
xxix, -x xvi-xxxvii (1927)). Thus, the Court concluded, "It]he contention that an injury
can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention [i.e., culpable mental state] is no
provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as
belief and freedom of human will and a consequent ability and duty of a normal individual to
choose between good and eviL" Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
An exception to this principle is the doctrine of strict liability, which allows for punishment without regard to intent or moral blameworthiness. However, "in this country the
United States Supreme Court has been zealous in maintaining the concept of mens rea as
the general rule." GERBER, supra note 16, at 69. It is thus quite possible that employing
strict liability to convict defendants for anything but relatively minor offenses would offend
due process. See id.; see also United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
("[R]hile... the legislature has dispensed with [mens real in some statutory offenses ....
these instances mark the exception and not the rule, and only in the most limited instances has linens rea] been omitted by the legislature as a requisite for an offense that was
a crime at common law.").
180 See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368-69 (Utah 1995).
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analyses were far more rhetorical and conclusory than systematic and
well-grounded in law. First, by erroneously describing the actual classification that the mens rea approach creates, the majority failed to
correctly assess whether the two groups classified were similarly situated. 81' Further, while both the majority and dissenting opinions had
the correct standard of review in mind, 8 2 they each failed to implement this standard in any meaningful way in their respective analyses
of the rationality (and therefore constitutionality) of the mens rea approach's disparate treatment of insane persons.
The Equal Protection Clause 8 3 generally ensures that "persons
similarly situated should be treated alike,"18 4 unless a sufficient justification exists for not doing so. It is implicated only when (1) state
action (2) creates a classification (3) distinguishing between persons
similarly situated.' 8 5 Because the legislature's enactment of a law
clearly qualifies as state action, this requirement needs no further
86
discussion.'
1.

The "Classification"Requiremznt

The second threshold element of an equal protection claim is
that the law create a classification. However, a coherent definition of
or theory behind the term "classification" is, surprisingly, absent from
almost all cases and commentaries addressing equal protection. Quite
possibly, the notion of what constitutes a classification is overlooked
because many assume to be true the proposition that "all laws classify."' 1 7 Even if this is so, it can hardly be said that all laws classify such
See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
182 Compare Herrera, 895 P.2d at 368-69 (applying rational basis review), with id. at
384-85 (Stewart, Assoc. CJ., dissenting) (similarly applying rational basis review).
183
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deny to any person... the
equal protection of the laws."). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires
that the federal government afford persons equal protection under the law. See Boling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
184
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
185
These, of course, are not the only showings a plaintiff must make in order to prevail on an equal protection claim. However, they are the threshold elements a plaintiff
must demonstrate in order for a claim to lie at all. Additionally, the plaintiff must successfully argue that the law's disparate treatment fails the relevant standard of review-in other
words, that it does not have a sufficient justification. See infra Part III.B.3.
186 For clarity, throughout the remainder of this Note I will replace the term "state
action" with the term "law." For example, instead of stating that "the state action was challenged on equal protection grounds," I will state that "the law was challenged on equal
protection grounds." Of course, many types of state action, such as administrative adjudication, do not involve the enactment of laws. However, this Note is concerned solely with
state action in the context of lawmaking.
187
See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 39 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting
that "[a] 11laws classify"); Michael J. Perry, Modem Equal Protection:A Conceptualizationand
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1068 (1979) ("Every time an agency of government
formulates a rule-in particular, every time a legislature enacts a law-it classifies."); Rich181

ard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living
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that they would allow for a serious equal protection claim.'l 8 Thus, it
is important to understand what exactly it is that creates a classification, because framing the classification correctly will facilitate later
stages of any equal protection analysis, such as the "similarly situated"
inquiry'8 9 and the determination of the appropriate standard of
review. 190
In their celebrated article The Equal Protection of the Laws, Joseph
Tussman andJacobus tenBroek attempted to convey the basic understanding of the idea of a classification as follows:
To define a class is simply to designate a quality or characteristic or
trait or relation, or any combination of these, the possession of
which, by an individual, determines his membership in or inclusion
within the class....
...[M] embership

in a class is determined by the possession of

the traits which define that class. Individual X is a member of class
A if,and only if, X possesses the traits which define class A.
Whatever the defining characteristics of a class may be, every member of that class will possess those characteristics. 19 1
Thus, observe Tussman and tenBroek, "[a] legislature defines a class,
or 'classifies,' when it enacts a law applying to 'all aliens ineligible for
citizenship,' or 'all persons convicted of three felonies,' or 'all citizens
between the ages of 19 and 25' or 'foreign corporations doing business within the state." 1 92 While this analysis is helpful insofar as Tussman and tenBroek define what a "class" is and give examples of what
would constitute a classification, they still do not define exactly what
virtue creates a classification. Therefore, I will do so here.
Webster's Revised UnabridgedDictionary defines a "classification" as
"a distribution into groups... according to some common relations or
Center, Inc., 88 Ky. LJ. 591, 600 (1999-2000) ("[AIll (or at least practically all) legislation
classifies. Thus, no laws would be immune from potential constitutional challenge." (footnote omitted)). Professor Perry explains this view most convincingly:
All laws classify. The law, "no one under sixteen years of age may obtain a
driver's license," obviously classifies potential drivers on the basis of age.
The law, "no one may sell pornography in Peoria," not only forbids everyone to sell pornography; it also classifies: forbidding the sale of pornography, but not, for example, bread.
MichaelJ. Perry, Constitutional "Fairness".Notes on Equal Protectionand Due Process, 63 VA. L.
REv. 383, 385 (1977) [hereinafter Perry, ConstitutionalFairness].
188 By this, I mean to say that even if all laws did classify, it would be proper to analyze
only a small percentage of these laws under the rubric of the Equal Protection Clause
because of the further requirement that the groups classified under the law be similarly
situated. See infra Part III.B.2.
189
See infra Part III.B.2.
190 See infra Part III.B.3.
191 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
REv. 341, 344-45 (1949).
192
Id. at 344.
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affinities."' 93 The pluralization of the word "group" in this definition
is quite important, in that a law must create at least two groups before
it can be said to establish a classification; otherwise, it creates only a
"class." Further, these two or more groups must necessarily have been
drawn from a single class within which the groups originally shared
some common trait that made them members of the class before they
were divided into groups. This requirement is not difficult to fulfill,
in that a class may be as broad as one desires. Because equal protection protects only people (and not, for example, animals), the
broadest class possible would be the class of which every person would
be a member-"people."' 19 4 A classification, then, occurs when two
distinct groups are drawn from this original class-for example, "people over the age of eighteen" and "people not over the age of
eighteen."
For a legitimate classification to exist, the two or more distinct
groups need not be mutually exclusive of one another. Although
there may be some overlap among the members-i.e., some persons
may be members of more than one group-there must be some people who will belong exclusively to one group and not the other.' 9 5 For
instance, the two groups, "people over the age of eighteen" and "people over the age of twenty-five," do not represent a proper classification in the equal protection sense. Here, all members of "people over
the age of twenty-five" are also members of "people over the age of
eighteen." Therefore, a law purporting to treat "people over the age
of twenty-five" differently from "people over the age of eighteen" is
illogical, because the way it treats "people over the age of eighteen"
would also apply to "people over the age of twenty-five." Thus, while
appearing to create two groups, it actually creates only one ("people
over the age of eighteen"), which does not meet the requirements of a
classification.
To fix this problem, one would leave one subgroup as "people
over the age of twenty-five" and change "people over the age of eighteen" to "people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five," or
"people not over the age of twenty-five," or even "people who attend
193

WEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

(1913 ed.) (emphasis added).

194 I should note that one rule does apply only to this particular class (that is, "people"), which is that because "people" is a class into which every person would fit, it may not
be considered in determining whether two or more subgroups are similarly situated. In
other words, the fact that two subgroups share the common trait "people" is not enough to
make them similarly situated for purposes of equal protection analysis, but it is enough to
create a classification. See infra Part III.B.2.
195
These are the people who would have standing to make an equal protection claim.
If the essence of an equal protection claim is that the challenged law treats two groups
differently-burdening one and/or benefiting the other-persons belonging to both
groups can choose to be part of the benefited group in the classification, and thus cannot
claim to have been injured.
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law school" (as there are law students under the age of twenty-fiveagain, the two subgroups need not be mutually exclusive). Whether
these groups are similarly situated is another matter, 196 but at the very
least, they represent a proper classification.
At this point, one might respond by contending that if the above
theory is correct, then Tussman and tenBroek incorrectly used a law
treating "all persons convicted of three felonies" in a certain manner
as an example of a classification. According to the above theory, this
law does not create a legitimate classification because it does not explicitly create two distinct groups-after all, "persons convicted of
three felonies" is only one group within the class "people." However,
a law creating the group "people convicted of three felonies" necessarily excludes "people not convicted of three felonies," and, therefore,
implicitly creates a classification. This is provided, though, that the
implied second subgroup is the logical target for differential treatment from the group that is mentioned. In sum, because a classification requires at least two distinct groups to be drawn from a single
class, if two groups are explicitly mentioned, then the inquiry as to
whether a legitimate classification exists is at an end, provided that the
groups do not completely overlap one another. If only one group is
mentioned, this is still sufficient to establish a legitimate classification
where the law would implicate another group-typically the first
group's logical counterpart.
That being said, there is one further aspect to a classification that
Tussman and tenBroek did not address, which is that inherent in the
notion that a law establishes a classification is the requirement that
the two or more subgroups it creates be classified specifically for the
purpose of being subject to differential treatment. 197 If the subgroups
are treated the same, it is likely that an equal protection claim will not
exist, because equal protection claims, by their nature, allege unequal
treatment. For example, if "people under the age of eighteen" and
"people over the age of eighteen" were treated the same, it would be
unnecessary to create the classification in the first place. Therefore, a
more complete definition of the term "classification" would be: "exSee infra Part III.B.2.
197 Cf Perry, ConstitutionalFairness, supra note 187, at 385 (observing that "[a] claim
not emphasizing differential treatment but simply asserting that a law fails to serve a legitimate objective is traditionally characterized as a substantive due process claim"). Therefore, even if the mens rea approach did not meet the requirements necessary to state a
cognizable equal protection claim, it still could be challenged on substantive due process
grounds for lack of rationality. However, because that substantive due process inquiry (not
to be confused with the "fundamental principle of liberty or justice" substantive due process inquiry conducted supra Part III.A) is almost equivalent to that which will be discussed
infra Part III.B.4, it would be duplicitous to address it here. The reader should therefore
assume that the analysis in that section could be imported into a "rationality" substantive
due process claim.
196
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tracting and separating two or more groups from a single class by virtue of one or more characteristics, and subjecting those groups to
differential treatment." 198
Working with this definition, one should consider how a law may

create a classification.

According to Ronald Rotunda and John

Nowak,
[a] classification .. .can be established [by a law] in one of three
ways. First, the law may establish the classification "on its face."
This means that the law by its own terms classifies persons for different treatment....
Second, the law may [classify] in its "application." In these
cases the law either shows no classification on its face or else indicates a classification which seems to be legitimate, but those persons
challenging the legislation claim that the governmental officials
who administer the law are applying it with different degrees of severity to different groups of persons who are described by some suspect trait....
Finally [and most importantly for purposes of this Note], the
law may contain no classification, or a neutral classification, and be
applied evenhandedly. Nevertheless the law may be challenged as
in reality constituting a device designed to impose different burdens
on [similarly situated] classes of persons. If this claim can be
proven the law will be reviewed as if it established such a classification on its face.1 9 9

An example of a law that clearly creates a classification on its face
would be a San Francisco city council ordinance stating that "all nonAsians may operate hand laundries in wooden buildings in the city of
San Francisco without a permit, but all Asians must obtain a permit."20 0 Other matters aside (that is, not engaging in any further
198
However, this is not to imply that the law may not permissibly classify. If groups are
not similarly situated, the law may classify them for differential treatment without implicating the Equal Protection Clause. However, whether the groups are similarly situated is a
separate inquiry, to be undertaken only after the determination that a classification exists
has been made. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text. Further, even if a classification exists and the groups are determined to be similarly situated, the government may still
treat the groups differently if it presents a sufficient justification. "The equal protection
clause.., does not reject the government's ability to classify persons or 'draw lines' in the
creation and application of laws .... If the government classification relates to a proper
governmental purpose, then the classification will be upheld." 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.2, at
208 (3d ed. 1999). Whether the justification is sufficient depends on the basis of the classification (race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) and on the consequent standard
of review employed (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis). See infra Part
III.B.3.
199 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 198, § 18.4, at 255-56. I will refer to this final
method as a classification "by intent."
200 This and the following examples are based upon Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). In that case, the classification was created by application.
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equal protection analysis), this law explicitly treats two groups (Asians
and non-Asians) differently. The typical mens rea approach statute,
20 1
however, does not appear to make such a facial classification.
In a classification "as applied," the law itself is facially neutral,
and, if applied evenhandedly to all persons, would pose no equal protection problem. However, in reality, it is not applied evenhandedly.
For instance, assume that the above hypothetical law is a facially neutral one that states, "all persons who operate hand laundries in
wooden buildings must obtain a permit." Assume also that the government agency with the authority to grant permits refuses to grant
permits to any Asians, even those who meet the necessary requirements for a permit, while granting permits to non-Asians meeting the
exact same requirements (or, alternatively, granting permits to nonAsians who do not meet the permit requirements). Here, the facially
neutral law has created a classification not through the city council's
enactment, but instead through the agency's biased implementation.
Regardless, the mens rea approach does not create a classification in
this manner, either, because such statutes seem to be correctly and
evenhandedly applied.
Therefore, because the mens rea approach is facially neutral and
is applied evenhandedly, the only other way to establish that it creates
a classification is by intent. This requires a showing that the government desired to bring about the differential treatment-that any discriminatory effect was not merely incidental to the actual purpose for
which the action was taken. In other words, regardless of any disproportionate impact, the government's purpose in enacting the law (or
20 2
at least one such purpose) must be to create the classification.
See supra text accompanying note 31.
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
("'Disproportionate impact is not ... the sole touchstone of an invidious [classification].'
Proof of... discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause." (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976))). A well-known case that illustrates this principle is McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987). In McCleskey, the Court faced an equal protection challenge to Georgia's facially
neutral death penalty statute. See id. at 284 nn.2-3. McCleskey's counsel presented to the
Court the Baldus study, a sophisticated statistical analysis of death penalty cases in Georgia
that took into account over two hundred variables. See id. at 286-87. The study very clearly
demonstrated that black defendants convicted of killing white victims were statistically
much more likely to receive the death penalty than were other types of convicted homicide
defendants, including those who were white. See id. Nevertheless, the Court refused to
find for McCleskey because he had not sufficiently proved that the state had enacted its
death penalty statute for a racially discriminatory purpose. See id. at 297-99.
However, it need not be proved that the government's sole motive in passing the law
was to discriminate. As the Court acknowledged in Arlington Heights
[Washington v. Davis] does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can
it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad
mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that
201

202
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When alleging a classification by intent, the plaintiffs claim is essentially that the neutral appearance of the law is being used as a
screen for the legislature's true motive-discrimination that would be
considered impermissible had it been attempted openly. It is often
20 3
difficult to obtain convincing evidence of this sort of allegation,
however, and when one considers the frequently heavier burden of
proof inherent in the motive test,20 4 along with the awkward position
a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one. In fact, it is
because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing
the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But... discrimination is not just another competing consideration.
When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating
factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified:
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66 (footnote omitted); see also Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("[Discriminatory purpose] implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because
of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects . .

").

Originally, the Supreme Court rejected a subjective, motive test in favor of an objective, effects-based inquiry, due to the problems inherent in proving subjective intent. See
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); infra note 203. However, Davis and
Arlington Heights represented the Court's change of heart on the issue. Cf Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on the Role of Motivation Under the Equal Protection Clause, 79 Nw. U. L. REv.
1009, 1009 (1984) ("Since Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court has insisted, at least on
a rhetorical level, that illegitimate motivation is a necessary ingredient of any violation of
the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause." (footnotes omitted)). Commentators have thoroughly
debated this area of law; however, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. For
purposes of this Note, it will suffice to say that in order to prove a classification by intent,
evidence of subjective illegitimate purpose is required, although such purpose may be
proved in part or in whole through circumstantial, objective evidence. See United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717 (1983) (holding that direct
evidence of discriminatory intent is not necessary for a finding of discrimination); infra
note 203.
203
Indeed, direct evidence can be exceedingly difficult to obtain. Legislative history,
which is one of the few sources of such evidence, normally would not be helpful, for it is
unlikely that a legislature would place any discriminatory motive "on the record." Cf Stephen E. Gottlieb, Reformulating the Motive/Effects Debate in Constitutional Adjudication, 33
WAYNE L. REv. 97, 105 (1986) ("Unless the [legislators] foolishly make their positions clear,
the courts are consigned to use an inferential method of proof."); Seth F. Kreimer, AllocationalSanctions: The Problem of NegativeRights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1335
(1984) ("Individual officials are unlikely to disclose impermissible motives, leaving the
courts to engage in historical psychoanalysis to uncover the illegitimate motivation."). Additionally, "[iln only rare cases would the direct testimony of members of the agency or
legislative body be admitted, due both to problems of separation of powers and the announced principle against searching inquiries into legislative motives." 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 198, § 18.4, at 264-65; see also Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of
Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REv. 879, 927-36
(1985) (noting that even if a court determines a decisionmaker's testimony to be necessary, legislative or administrative privilege may bar the inquiry). Furthermore, even if one
were to obtain direct evidence of discriminatory intent by a small portion of those comprising a government body, it might nonetheless be difficult to ascribe that same intent to the
body as a whole. See Gottlieb, supra, at 104.
204 Although a motive test would be easier to satisfy when, for example, disproportionate impact is not clear, it is more often the case that disproportionate impact, and not
motive, will be apparent. See supra note 202. When this occurs, an effects test obviously
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in which it places the judiciary, 205 the difficulty the plaintiff encounters becomes quite apparent. Apart from statistical evidence of
impact, the Court has mentioned a number of other possible evidentiary sources that one could utilize to evince intent. While this list is
not exhaustive, such evidence includes the historical background of
the law, the specific sequence of events leading up to its passage, departures from a normal procedural sequence, substantive departures
(if,for example, factors the government normally considers important
favor a legislative result contrary to that reached), legislative history,
and-in extraordinary circumstances-direct testimony from
20 6
decisionmakers.
To illustrate, recall the facially neutral version of the hypothetical
San Francisco laundry ordinance discussed earlier 20 7 and further assume that the government agency in charge of implementation applies it evenhandedly. However, in this scenario, the law also places
the cost of a permit at $50,000. This, in itself, is still a facially neutral
law, but suppose also that: (1) there is evidence in the ordinance's
history that the city council, before determining the permit fee, examined statistics showing that only three percent of all Asians in the
city earned over $50,000 annually, whereas over seventy-five percent of
all non-Asians earned the same amount; (2) the city's normal practice
is to place permit fees at a figure no higher than the amount it would
incur in expenses to ensure compliance with the regulations, and
here, the cost to the city would only be around $10,000 per business;
(3) the city council enacted the ordinance immediately before ten
Asian-owned hand laundries were set to open (a fact known to the
would require a lesser burden of proof, as the effects themselves, without further evidence,
would often be conclusive. Under the motive test, only in the most extreme cases will
courts allow effects alone to constitute conclusive evidence of motive. See, e.g., Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding unconstitutional a legislative act altering the
shape of Tuskegee, Alabama, from a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure that had the
effect of removing all but four or five of its four hundred black voters, while not removing
a single white voter or resident); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 ("Absent a pattern as
stark as that in Gomillion. . . , impact alone is not determinative . . . ."). In cases where
effects (and not motive) are clear, then, I would argue that because the motive test almost
always requires other proof in addition to proof of effects, whereas an effects test could be
satisfied through evidence of effects alone, a motive test will frequently pose a heavier
burden of proof than an effects test.
205 According to Rotunda and Nowak:
In these cases the Court is confronted by decision-making entities to whom
it feels it owes some deference....
It is not easy to establish the proper role of the Court in this area....
On the other hand, the Court cannot allow all laws to stand unchallenged when they may constitute devices used by another branch of government to subvert the equal protection guarantee. Thus, the Supreme Court
is faced with a most difficult problem....
3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 198, § 18.4, at 264-65.
206
See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68.
207 See supra text following note 201.
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council, according to the legislative history); and (4) the council was
aware of another set of statistics showing that out of all hand laundries
in wooden buildings in the city, approximately seventy-five percent
were Asian-owned. All of the above evidence is, of course, circumstantial, and while any one piece, standing alone, might not be enough to
meet the plaintiffs burden of proof, taken together they strongly suggest the intent to create a classification.
With this in mind, the available evidence in the insanity context
militates strongly in favor of the conclusion that the intent behind the
mens rea approach is to create a classification. First, the disparate
impact of such statutes is clear, for two reasons. One, as mentioned
above, 20 8 is that the mens rea approach allows only a small fraction of
all insane persons 20 9 to successfully raise a defense based upon a disorder. Second, given two insane persons, the mens rea approach allows
one whose illness would negate mens rea to present evidence of a disorder, while the other-whose diagnosis could very well be identical
to that of the first person but whose particular mental state would not
negate mens rea-is barred from so doing. 210 Thus, in effect, it takes
one class ("insane persons"), classifies it into two groups-"insane persons that do not possess mens rea" and "insane persons that do possess mens rea"-and treats them dissimilarly, by conferring a benefit
upon one (in allowing it to present evidence of mental abnormality)
and placing a burden upon the other (in disallowing the same type of
evidence) .211 However, this impact certainly does not rise to the level
of pervasive invidiousness present in Gomillion v. Lighfoot,212 in that
one could probably devise some plausible neutral reason as to why the
mens rea approach might be adopted, yet one could hardly come up
with a straight-faced explanation for the patently racist statute in
Gomillion.2 13 Therefore, the disparate effect of the mens rea approach
would probably not pass as conclusive evidence of intent, but instead
would serve only as one factor in the overall calculus. Even so, other
considerations, such as historical background and legislative history,
are helpful in arriving at the conclusion that an intent to classify
existed.
In regard to direct evidence of discriminatory motive, the available legislative histories of the specific mens rea approach statutes are,
208

See supra Part I.C.

Here, this Note uses "insane person" in the same sense in which it uses the phrase
"insane defendant." See supra note 43.
209

210

See supra Part I.C.

211 The typical mens rea approach statute therefore meets all of the requirements of a
classification. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
212
213

364 U.S. 339 (1960); see supra note 204.
See supra note 204.
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not surprisingly, brief and unhelpful 2 14-apparently, legislators learn
from experience not to be overly candid while "on the record." 215
However, one need not look directly to these sources to obtain circumstantial evidence of why the statutes were passed. The mens rea
approach was only one type of reform in the overall insanity defense
reform movement, the goal of which was to decrease not only the
number of defendants who could enter a plea of insanity, but also to
decrease the number of defendants who successfully used mental abnormality to excuse themselves of criminal responsibility. Therefore, one
can infer that legislators, by adopting the mens rea approach, were
aware that they would be preventing the successful use of mental abnormality to escape criminal responsibility by individuals who possessed the requisite mens rea, but who would nonetheless prevail
under an extrinsic insanity defense. The substantial evidence of legislators' negative views of the insanity defense and those who assert it
serves only to support such an inference.2 16 In regard to Montana's
statutory scheme specifically, even more damaging evidence of this
bias against the insanity defense exists. As one commentator learned
through a telephone interview with Michael H. Keedy, the former
Montana state representative who introduced the bill in 1979 to abolish Montana's insanity defense:
[IT] he abolition of the insanity defense proposed by Montana legislators was not motivated by concerns linked to [objective reasons]
.

. .

. Keedy stated that his motivation in drawing up the bill

stemmed from the belief that the "insanity defense is a perversion of
the basic tenet of the criminal justice system-holding people accountable for their actions." Thus, what prompted Montana's reform was the legislators' and their constituents' negative impression
of the insanity defense .... 217
It is highly probable that legislators and citizens of other states share
this view as well.
As a whole, these factors strongly suggest that the legislative intent behind the mens rea approach was to create a classification
among insane persons. Accordingly, the mens rea approach qualifies
214 See S. 1396, 46th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1982) [hereinafter Idaho Legislature
Statement ofPurpose]; Hearingson H.B. 877 Before the Executive Session of the House SenateJudiciary, 1979 Leg., 46th Sess. 3, 12 (Mont. 1979) [hereinafter Montana Executive Session Hear-

ings]; Hearingson H.B. 877 Before the SenateJudiciaryComm., 1979 Leg., 46th Sess. 4-5 (Mont.
1979). This is not to say that the legislature's purpose in enacting the mens rea approach
was rational for purposes of determining whether a rational basis exists-however, there is

no direct evidence of a purpose to discriminate against the insane.
215 See Gottlieb, supra note 203, at 104-05; supra note 203.
216
217

See supranote 9.

Buitendorp, supra note 34, at 967 n.9 (quoting Telephone Interview by Rita D.
Buitendorp with Michael H. Keedy, Representative, Montana State Legislature (Feb. 25,
1995)).
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as an intent classification, and thus should be treated as though it created a classification on its face. 218
2.

The "Similarly Situated" Requirement

Even if a legitimate classification exists, no equal protection claim
will lie if the two or more groups that are classified for differential
treatment are not similarly situated. 2 19 Indeed, the theory behind
equal protection requires it, as a logical implication of the proposition
that similarly situated persons must be treated similarly is that dissimilarly situated persons need not be treated similarly.
Naturally, this begs the question, "what does that ambiguous and
crucial phrase 'similarly situated' mean?" 220 In this regard, it may

help to establish what the phrase does not mean, which is that the two
or more groups classified by the law for different treatment must be
exactly the same-a proposition that would be inconsistent with the
definition of a classification. 22 ' The question of how similar the two
groups must actually be in order to qualify as similarly situated depends on the relationship between the groups with respect to the law.
The majority in Herreraimplicitly contended that the two groups
at which the mens rea approach is aimed are not similarly situated,
classifying them as (1) defendants who do not possess the mens rea to
commit a crime and (2) defendants who do possess the requisite mens
rea. 22 2 Because any group can be classified as "persons who x," two
groups that share only this trait (i.e., personhood) cannot, as a rule,
218
219

See supra note 199 and accompanying text.

See Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act's Disparate Restrictions on Attorney's Fees, 89 CAL. L. REv. 999,

1013-14 (2001). Professor Branham states that:
When undertaking an equal protection analysis, the threshold inquiry is
whether the two groups . . . treated differently by a statute are "similarly
situated." If they are not, then the statute's discrepant treatment of the two
groups does not implicate the requirements of equal protection. For example, if a statute levies an income tax on adults, but not small children, a
court need not belabor itself [with a further equal protection analysis].
The statute clearly passes constitutional muster from an equal protection
standpoint because small children and adults are not similarly situated for
revenue-generation purposes; small children are not employed and receive
no income upon which a tax could be levied.
Id. (footnotes omitted). This is one reason the majority's equal protection analysis in State
v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995), is plainly incorrect. By implicitly determining that
the two groups classified by the mens rea approach were dissimilarly situated, see infra note
222 and accompanying text, the majority should not even have proceeded to analyze
whether a sufficient justification for the classification existed. In other words, by proceeding to the next step in the equal protection analysis, the majority in Herreracontradicted
itself.
220
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 191, at 345.
221
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
222
See Herrera, 895 P.2d at 368-69 ("The legislature has drawn a line between those
who do not comprehend that they are taking a human life and those who do.").
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be similarly situated-otherwise, every group could be similarly situated to any other group, no matter how different they are in reality.
Thus, the majority's conclusion looks sound at first glance, because
those who do not possess mens rea are certainly not similarly situated
to those who do possess mens rea.
Of course, this is only true as long as "persons" is the sole similar
trait between the two groups, which is simply not the case here. By
ignoring the legislative purpose behind the law, the Herrera court
made an incorrect determination of the complete classification at
which the law is aimed. The groups share one additional, critical trait:
they both consist of persons who are insane. It will always be possible
to find some difference between two groups receiving disparate treatment in order to determine that they are not similarly situated. However, it is not the role of the courts to find such a difference through
their own creativity and manipulation; rather, their role is to determine the legislature's target in enacting the statutory scheme in question in order to determine whether two groups are similarly situated
with respect to the law's purpose. In this case, the classification is between (1) insane persons with mens rea and (2) insane persons without
mens rea, as the term "insane persons" describes the exclusive class
the statute, by its terms, implicates. Certainly, this type of statute does
not apply to an individual who does not suffer from a mental abnormality, regardless of whether he possesses the requisite mens rea.
Viewed in this light, the two classes are similarly situated with respect
to the law, in that members of both classes suffer from a mental abnormality, and only these individuals were the target of this particular
2 23
legislative scheme.
223
The statute at issue in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (19.66), helps clarify this concept. In Rinaldi, a New Jersey statute required certain indigent prisoners, but not nonprisoners, to reimburse counties for the costs of their transcripts on appeal should the
appeal fail. See id. at 307. Before it could advance to the merits of the equal protection
claim, the Court would have had to determine that the two groups the statute classified"persons who are indigent prisoners" and "persons who are indigent nonprisoners'-are
similarly situated. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. Upon first impression, one
might conclude that because one group includes only prisoners and the other includes
only nonprisoners, the two groups are not similarly situated. However, the law does not
involve only a class of prisoners, because the law does not target some prisoners-namely,
prisoners who are not litigants. Inherent in the status of being indigent is the fact that one
is a litigant; therefore, the classification the law actually creates is "persons who are indigent litigants and prisoners" and "persons who are indigent litigants and nonprisoners."
From this conclusion, it follows that because the law targets only the class society would
label as "litigants," and because the purpose of the law is to target only the class "indigent
litigants" (thus classifying two groups, "persons who are indigent litigants and prisoners"
and "persons who are indigent litigants and nonprisoners"), members of both groups are
"litigants" and, therefore, the two groups are similarly situated.
Professor Branham's income tax example is another illustration of this concept. See
Branham, supra note 219, at 1013-14. There, the two groups are dissimilarly situated not
because one group is a child and one is an adult, but because one group pays income tax
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Establishingthe Approriate Standard of Review

Even after one satisfies the aforementioned threshold requirements-state action, the classification requirement, and the similarly
situated requirement-one must not forget that the law may still permissibly classify similarly situated persons if a sufficient justification
exists. 2 24 Whether the justification the state proffers is sufficient depends on the standard of review a court ultimately employs. A court
must choose between three "levels" of review: strict scrutiny,225 intermediate scrutiny,2 26 and rational basis (to which courts sometimes refer as "mere rationality"). 2 27 Rational basis is the appropriate
and the other does not. The classification in Branham's example is thus not between "persons who are adults" and "persons who are children," but between "persons who pay in-

come tax and are adults" and "persons who do not pay income tax and are children." The
law in Branham's example targeted those who pay income tax, regardless of whether or
not they are adults. Therefore, if the same law had instead exempted children who do pay
income tax from paying the tax, the two groups the law would then classify-"persons who
pay income tax and are adults" and "persons who pay income tax and are children"would be similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
224 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
225 Strict scrutiny is the most demanding standard courts use when reviewing classifications based upon certain "suspect" traits, including race, national origin, and alienage. See
3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 198, § 18.3(a). But see id. § 18.11 (noting that if an alienage classification relates to allocating power or positions in the political process, courts will
subject the law only to a rational basis inquiry). Additionally, if the classification implicates
a "fundamental right," courts will use the strict scrutiny standard. See id. § 18.3(a), at 217.
When applying strict scrutiny, "the Justices will not defer to the decision of the other
branches of government but will instead independently determine the degree of relationship which the classification bears to a constitutionally compelling end." Id. at 216-17. To
prevail, the government must demonstrate not only a compelling interest for creating the
classification, but also that the classification is "narrowly tailored" to promote that interest.
Id.
226 Originally, only two tiers of review existed: strict scrutiny and rational basis. Intermediate scrutiny, which the Court first formally recognized in Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), "developed as a separate standard because in some cases neither the extremely
deferential standard of rational basis nor the demanding standard of strict scrutiny seemed
to be adequate." Robert S. Logan, Note, The Reverse EqualProtectionAnalysis: A New Methodologyfor "Special Needs" Cases, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 447, 465 (2000). It is a relatively young
standard-indeed, "[a]t the close of the 1960's it was still possible to do a detailed analysis
of all Supreme Court equal protection decisions in terms of a 'two-tiered' model involving
recognition of only [strict scrutiny and rational basis review]." 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra
note 198, § 18.3, at 218.
To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a classification must have a "substantial relationship" to an "important governmental interest." See Craig,429 U.S. at 197. But see United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (asserting that an "exceedingly persuasive justification" is required). The Court employs this standard for classifications based upon
"quasi-suspect" (also called "semi-suspect") traits, such as gender and illegitimacy. See 3
ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 198, § 18.3, at 219.
227
Courts employ rational basis review for classifications based upon traits that do not
demand either strict or intermediate scrutiny. Thus one may characterize it as "the default
method for examining assertions of equal protection violations." Logan, supra note 226, at
462. To prevail under this standard, the classification must serve only a "legitimate governmental interest" and be "rationally related" to furthering that interest. Id. at 463. The
rational basis test is extremely deferential; under this standard, "[t] raditionally, courts do
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standard under which a court should evaluate the mens rea approach
because the approach does not classify the two groups by any suspect
228
trait that mandates heightened scrutiny.
nothing more than determine 'whether a classification is wholly arbitrary,' thereby placing
a nearly insurmountable task upon those challenging the law." Ren6 J. LeBlanc-Allman,
Guilty but Mentally ilL A PoorPrognosis,Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 49 S.C. L. REv.
1095, 1110 (1998) (footnote omitted) (quoting JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 608 (5th ed. 1995)). Indeed, the Court has not required
that the legislature explicitly state a purpose for the classification, instead holding that if
any conceivable rational basis exists for the classification (that is, any set of facts that could
conceivably justify the classification), it must be upheld. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 324 (1993) (upholding a classification based upon plausible justifications); see infra
Part HLI.B.4. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Court invalidates very few statutory
schemes under this standard.
228 Some might disagree with this conclusion, and argue that because the classification
created by the mens rea approach disadvantages most insane persons, it qualifies for a
heightened form of the rational basis test, commonly referred to as rational basis "with
bite." See, e.g., LeBlanc-Allman, supra note 227, at 1110-13 (discussing the equal protection implications of "guilty but mentally ill" statutes and determining that because they
burden insane persons, these laws require a heightened level of scrutiny); Sarah J.
Bredemeier, Comment, Hollow Verdict: Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Provokes Animus-Based
Discriminationin the Social Security Ac 31 ST. MaRu's L.J. 697 (2000) (arguing for "rational
basis with bite" scrutiny for a law limiting social security benefits for certain insane people);
Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: IntermediateScrutiny by Any Other Name,
62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987) (discussing the application of "rational basis with bite" review
during the Supreme Court's 1985 Term).
This heightened rational basis test has its roots in City of Cleburne v. CleburneLiving Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In Cleburne, a Texas city denied the respondent a special use
permit for the establishment of a home for mentally retarded persons even though it allowed similar permits for nursing homes, fraternities, and other specialty housing in the
same area. See id. at 435-37. While the Court declined to consider the mentally retarded
as either a suspect or quasi-suspect class, it invalidated the ordinance under what it termed
a rational basis test. See id. at 446-47, 450. However, the Court appeared to apply a heightened level of scrutiny. See id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The [majority] holds the ordinance invalid on rational-basis grounds and disclaims
that anything special, in the form of heightened scrutiny, is taking place. Yet Cleburne's
ordinance surely would be valid under the traditional rational-basis test applicable to economic and commercial regulation."). Some scholars point to Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), for the proposition that this heightened form of rational basis remains vital in
equal protection jurisprudence. See Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex DiscriminationArgument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REv. 471, 483 n.62 (citing scholars who read
Romer for this proposition). According to these scholars, in Romer, the Court performed a
more searching inquiry than is typically conducted under the traditional rational basis test
when it invalidated an amendment to Colorado's constitution that prohibited governmental protection of gays and lesbians. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-36; Stein, supra, at 483-84.
I would question the rationale of these scholars' argument for two reasons. First, the
Court has never explicitly acknowledged such a theory (that a heightened form of rational
basis review exists) to be correct. In fact, in Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993), another case
involving equal protection of the mentally retarded that was decided after Cleburne but
before Romer, the Court appeared to apply a much less stringent form of rational basis
review than it applied in Cleburne- Compare id. at 324-28, with Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
Also, in Romer, it seems that the Court invalidated the Colorado amendment under the
traditional rational basis test, not under any form of heightened rational basis review. See
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-36. Many scholars seem to imply that the invocation of the rational
basis standard means that the Court will inevitably uphold the law. See, e.g., Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HIARv.
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What Does "RationalBasis" Mean, Anyway?: Testing the Mens
Rea Approach

It is highly uncommon, and thus presumably difficult, for a plaintiff to prevail under the rational basis test;229 however, this is not to say
that a court's decision to employ the test automatically means that it
will uphold the challenged law.28 0 This section first explores the
framework of the rational basis test, then applies the test to determine
L. REv. 56, 79 (1997) (asserting that "judicial scrutiny under rational basis review is typically so deferential as to amount to a virtual rubber stamp"). While this is often true,
overcoming the rational basis test is certainly not an impossible task. As mentioned supra
note 227, for a law to survive rational basis review, it must be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528

(1973), the Court held that the "bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group" was not a legitimate state purpose, and the Romer Court relied on this statement to
conclude that this was the only conceivable purpose for the Colorado amendment. See
Romer,517 U.S. at 634-36. The Court decided Romer the way it did because the state action
in that case failed the "legitimate governmental purpose" prong of the traditionalrational
basis test. At the very least, a close reading of Heller and Romer calls into question the
propriety of any "rational basis with bite" theory. Further, even if the Court recognized the
"rational basis with bite" test, and classifications involving the mentally retarded as well as
gays and lesbians are entitled to some form of heightened scrutiny, it does not follow that
the Court would extend this protection to the insane-indeed, I would go so far as to say
that the Court would not be willing to extend such protection.
Second, implying that the classification in the mens rea approach deserves heightened
scrutiny simply because it involves insane persons misstates the manner in which one
should determine the appropriate standard of review. To begin with, the defense of insanity (whether extrinsic or negativing) applies only to insane persons. Therefore, one
cannot say that altering the insanity defense discriminates against insane persons as a
whole. The law does not burden all insane persons (although it burdens most), and it
seems axiomatic that for a law to discriminate against a class as a whole, it must discriminate against all members of the class, not just part of the class (even a large part). One
determines the correct standard of review by looking at the trait that triggers differential
treatment among the groups the law classifies and ascertaining whether the trait is a suspect trait (e.g., race or gender). Here, while "insanity" is the trait that leads one to the
conclusion that the two groups classified by the mens rea approach are. similarly situated,
this is a different inquiry than that used to determine the appropriate standard of review.
In the context of the mens rea approach, both groups are insane; therefore, this trait does
not trigger differential treatment. Rather, the possession of mens rea is what triggers the
burden on one group in the classification, and this is obviously not a trait that would result
in a court employing heightened scrutiny.
229
See supra note 227.
230
See Branham, supra note 219, at 1052 ("The Court has insisted.., that the rational
basis test is not 'toothless' and that it provides meaningful protection from the erratic and
disparate treatment that are the hallmarks of invidious discrimination." (quoting Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976))); Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the
Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. Rxv. 357, 357 (1999)

("[S]uccessful rational basis claims under the Equal Protection Clause ... are sufficiently
rare to stand out as unusual, but they do exist."); Saphire, supra note 187, at 607 (responding to Professor Fallon's characterization ofjudicial review under the rational basis test as
.so deferential as to amount to a virtual rubber stamp" by noting that "a 'virtual' rubber
stamp is not necessarily the same as the real thing" (quoting Fallon, supra note 228, at 79)).
Professor Farrell notes that since 1974, the Court has invalidated statutes under the rational basis test in ten cases, while it has rejected such claims on one hundred other occasions-a success rate of approximately 9%. See Farrell, supra, at 357.

THE CRAZIEST REFORM OF THEM ALL

2002]

1557

whether the mens rea approach passes muster under this highly deferential standard of review.
a.

The Basic Requirements of the Rational Basis Test

The usual formulation of the rational basis test requires that the
challenged law have some rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose.23 ' There are two distinct requirements implicit in this definition: first, that a "legitimate state purpose" exist for the legislation
(the "legitimate purpose" requirement), and second, that the legislation be "rationally related" to achieving that purpose (the "nexus"
requirement).
The first requirement of the rational basis test is that the challenged law have a legitimate state purpose. The word "legitimate" is
crucial, in that not just any purpose will suffice. 23 2 One might say,
then, that a legitimate state purpose is not among those that one
would consider to be improper for a rational, impartial government to
possess2 33 -hence the Supreme Court's determination that "a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest," 234 and that a legislative
enactment motivated by "animus toward the class [the law] affects...
lacks a rational relationship to legitimatestate interests."2 35
The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that in determining whether a legitimate purpose exists under the rational basis
231
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) ("A
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively
supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the
State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.").
232
See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 876 (1985) (stating that "the
promotion of domestic industry" is not generally a legitimate state purpose); Moreno, 413
U.S. at 534 (finding that a "bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group" is not a legitimate governmental interest).
233
Cf Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens discusses the characteristics of rationality in greater detail:
The term "rational," of course, includes a requirement that an impartial
lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disad-

vantaged class.

Thus, the word "rational" . . . includes elements of

legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of
the sovereign's duty to govern impartially.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
234
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
235
Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (emphasis added). Here, a court must be
careful not to run afoul of its proper role in employing the rational basis test. There is a
major difference between declaring a law to have an illegitimate purpose because it has a
fundamentally improper purpose, and declaring it to have an illegitimate purpose because
it is ill-advised. The judiciary may do the former under the rational basis test, but not the
latter. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) ("[The] rational-basis standard.., does not allow [the Court] to substitute [its] personal notions of good public
policy for those of Congress.").
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test, courts must consider not only the purpose(s) articulated by the
legislature, but also any other conceivable purpose.23 6 Therefore, if a
court could find no conceivable legitimate purpose for a law, including those articulated by the legislature, it could correctly say that no
rational basis exists; thus, an inquiry into the nexus between the enactment of the law and the purpose it seeks to achieve would be
unnecessary.
As simple as this proposition appears, it can pose a number of
problems. It is relatively obvious that if all conceivable government
purposes for a statute are legitimate, the statute will be deemed to
have a rational purpose. The converse is equally apparent; that is to
say, if all conceivable purposes for a law are illegitimate, the law will
not have a legitimate purpose. For example, although it was a strict
scrutiny case, in Gomillion the Court found that the only conceivable
purpose for the reapportionment of the city from a square into an
"uncouth" twenty-eight-sided figure, which excluded all but four black
voters while maintaining the same number of white voters,2 37 was to
discriminate against blacks. Because this purpose (certainly the only
conceivable one) was illegitimate, in addition to failing the strict scrutiny test, the state action involved would have also failed the rational
23 8
basis test.

What would happen, then, if any of the following scenarios were
to occur: (1) the legislature articulates only legitimate purposes, but
there are conceivable illegitimate purposes for the law; (2) the legislature articulates an illegitimate purpose for the law, but there are other
conceivable legitimate purposes for the law; or (3) the legislature ar236 SeeHeller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993) ("'The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,'
whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record." (citation omitted) (quoting
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973))). Professor Branham
has discussed this aspect of the rational basis test:
It will not suffice if the plaintiff demonstrates that the interest cited by the
legislature to justify the differential treatment of similarly situated individuals is not legitimate or that the statute is not sufficiently linked to a legitimate governmental interest. Instead, the plaintiff must show that the
statute does not further any "conceivable" legitimate governmental interest
that might arguably support this legislation, regardless of whether or not
the legislature enacted the statute with this interest in mind.

Branham, supra note 219, at 1018.
237 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340-41 (1960).
238
As Chief Judge Posner explained in MiMer v. Apfek
If a law is challenged as a denial of equal protection, and all that the government can come up with in defense of the law is that the people who are
hurt by it happen to be irrationally hated or irrationally feared by a majority
of voters, it is difficult to argue that the law is rational if "rational" in this
setting is to mean anything more than democratic preference. And it must
mean something more if the concept of equal protection is to operate, in
accordance with its modern interpretations, as a check on majoritarianism.
148 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 1998).
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ticulates both legitimate and illegitimate purposes for the law? The
short answer is, "nothing." In the first scenario, the law will assume
that a legitimate purpose exists, because one could easily conceive of
illegitimate purposes for most laws, regardless of whether the legislature actually contemplated such purposes. In the second and third
scenarios, even though the legislature has articulated an illegitimate
purpose, the law could still be said to have at least one legitimate pur2 39
pose, and will thus pass muster under the rational basis test.

The second requirement of the rational basis test is that the law
have a rational relationship to any legitimate purpose. 240 Generally,
this standard is so lenient that most laws can be said to have such a
relationship. However, it is still axiomatic that for a law to have a rational relationship to the purpose for which the legislature enacted it,
it must not completely fail to serve that purpose-in other words, the
means chosen (i.e., the law) cannot be "wholly unrelated to the
objective."2 4 '
According to Michael Perry, for a law to satisfy the nexus requirement (and therefore have a rational basis), the premise (s) underlying
it must at least be plausibly accurate; if it is not, then the law cannot be
said to serve the purpose at all.2 42 Professor Perry calls this concept
"fairness-as-accuracy."2 43 To illustrate how it functions, he gives the
following hypothetical: "Imagine that a legislature, fearful that red dye
No. 2 causes cancer, enacts a law prohibiting the use of the dye in
human foodstuffs. 2' 44 Perry explains that "[t]his [law] makes no
sense-it lacks legitimacy-unless the factual premise that the dye
might be carcinogenic is plausibly accurate. If the premise is not even
plausibly accurate," Perry asserts, "then prohibiting use of the dye
does absolutely nothing to serve the interest in curtailing cancer .... It

offends fairness-as-accuracy."2 45 As he goes on to argue:
239 Of course, many would likely disagree with this outcome on a number of grounds,
and I, too, am inclined to argue that once the legislature articulates any illegitimate purpose for enacting the law, no amount of conceivable legitimate purposes should suffice to
save it. However, this is clearly not the view of the current Supreme Court, and a further
discussion of this concept is beyond the scope of this Note. For purposes of this Note, it is
enough to say that if a law has at least one conceivable legitimate purpose, it will be upheld, provided it passes the nexus requirement of the rational basis test.
240 It is important to note what this requirement does not ask, which is whether there
are more desirable, alternative means that could achieve the law's purpose.
241 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). However, as one commentator has observed, "the rationality requirement does not require that the classificatory distinction be
rationally related to all possible legislative purposes." Note, Legislative Purpose,Rationality,
and EqualProtection, 82 YALE LJ. 123, 151 (1972). Thus a rational relationship to only one
conceivable purpose will suffice.
242 Perry, ConstitutionalFairness,supranote 187, at 393.
243 See id. at 390.
244 Id. at 392.
245 Id. at 392-93.
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The factual premises of some laws are subject to empirical verification-for example, the premise that red dye No. 2 might be carcinogenic. Other "factual" premises are not verifiable-for example,
the premise that the Creator forbids abortion [though this is a premise that would likely fail the legitimate purpose requirement]. Of
factual premises that are theoretically verifiable, some are obviously
true, or virtually so-for example, the premise that women will be
materially better off if guaranteed equal pay. Some others are not
obviously true, but neither are they readily subject to empirical testing-for example, the premise that in the community's ethical view,
"there is a real difference between doing in self-interest and doing
24 6
for hire."
If a law is based upon a factual, verifiable premise, but the premise is not plausibly accurate, then one can say that the law lacks any
rational relationship to its purpose, and thus fails the nexus requirement. However, tweaking Perry's hypothetical slightly, even if it were
statistically more probable than not that red dye No. 2 does not cause
cancer, there would nonetheless be a plausible basis for the law-that
red dye No. 2 might cause cancer-which would satisfy the nexus requirement. 2 47 Further, "[i]f a law is premised on a factual judgment
that is not verifiable, a court will not-because it cannot-invalidate it
on the ground that the judgment is inaccurate. '248 Thus, if a law is
premised on a judgment that is factual in nature but not readily subject to empirical testing, a court must find that the law satisfies the
nexus requirement. According to Perry:
To presume otherwise would demean the legislative process....
...Government must respond to a wide variety of complex
problems. To do so effectively, it needs a latitude ofjudgment that
inevitably entails some factual inaccuracy. Moreover, legislatures
have both primary authority for rulemaking and a factfinding competence generally superior to that of the judiciary. A proper respect
...demands that a court not strike down a law ... on the basis of

246
Id. at 393 (quoting Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 116 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
247
See id. at 394 n.52.
Id. at 394. It is one thing for a court to invalidate a law because its purpose rests on
248
a premise that runs against all available empirical data, or is contrary to what might be
called "common sense." It is quite another thing, however, for a court to invalidate a law
because the court does not agree with the legislature's decision to choose one position
over another (even if the position chosen carries some, but less, factual support), or because no empirical data are available. Again, the former is a permissible role of the judiciary-otherwise, courts would be giving legislators carte blanche to "decree reality to the
extent politically possible." Id. at 397. The latter role, however, is not appropriate under
the rational basis test.
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judicial disagreement with a factual judgment, unless the judgment
2 49
lacks even a plausible basis.
b.

Applying the RationalBasis Test to the Mens Rea Approach

If one were to take a cynical view of a plaintiff's chance of prevailing under the rational basis test, one might consider this entire section unnecessary--in other words, the mere conclusion that the
standard to be applied is rational basis would end the inquiry, and the
state would immediately triumph. However, as the above analysis indicates, if a court correctly applies the principles underlying the notion
of "rational basis," in certain circumstances the test may indeed have
some teeth to it. In this subsection, I propose conceivable purposes
for the mens rea approach-some of which have already been articulated by legislatures, some of which have not-and examine each
under the aforementioned principles in order to determine whether
25 0
they pass muster under the rational basis test.
i.

Five Conceivable Purposesfor the Mens Rea Approach

It seems that there are five conceivable purposes for the mens rea

approach that would not, on their face, be considered illegitimate: (1)
to curb abuse of the extrinsic insanity defense; (2) to prevent the insane from being hastily released; (3) to provide for treatment of the
insane; (4) to hold individuals personally accountable for their actions; and (5) to eliminate confusion and inconsistency resulting from
considering mental illness in the guilt phase of the trial. I will now
consider the rationality of each of these possible purposes in turn.
* To curb abuse of the extrinsic insanity defense
2 51
It is often argued that the insanity defense is heavily abused.
One possible purpose for adopting the mens rea approach, then,
249

Id. at 394 (footnotes omitted). In sum, for a law to fail the nexus requirement,

there would have to exist (1) a factually verifiable premise for the law, (2) no factual evidence supporting that premise, and (3) factual evidence contradicting the premise. Of
course, where the only premise(s) for the law is (are) not factual in nature, the concept of
fairness-as-accuracy is inapplicable. In such a case, the primary scrutiny of the premise
would occur under the legitimate purpose requirement. However, if the premise were
legitimate, one would still determine whether the law logically could be said to serve that
purpose at all.
250 I recognize that it can be relatively tempting to depart from the above principles in
order to find what is actually a rational basis to be irrational. See Note, supra note 241, at
138 ("[I]t is always possible... to define a statute's purpose such that the statute will not
meet the rationality requirement."). However, I attempt to avoid such a bias here, stating
the conceivable bases in a light favorable to the state, as well as analyzing them consistent
with the principles I have introduced above.
251
See Hermann, supra note 7, at 987 ("[T]he view [is] often expressed that too many
criminals escape punishment by pleading and, in some instances, feigning insanity. The
general view is that the insanity defense is too frequently used and is too often a means for
defendants to escape their just punishment." (footnote omitted)). President Nixon once
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would be to lessen this purported misuse. This purpose would definitely qualify as legitimate, as a state may certainly take measures to
curtail abuse of its processes. However, whether adopting the mens
rea approach is rationally related to furthering this goal is a more difficult question; nevertheless, it must ultimately be answered in the
affirmative.
Perlin makes a strong case as to why this particular purpose is
based upon a premise that amounts to little more than a myth:
All empirical analyses have been consistent: the public at large and
the legal profession (especially legislators) "dramatically" and
"grossly" overstate both the frequency and the success rate of the
insanity plea ....
The most recent research reveals, for instance,
that the insanity defense is used in only about one percent of all
felony cases, and is successful just about one-quarter of the time.
What is as startling as any other fact unearthed by empiricists is

the realization that, as recently as 1985, directors of forensic services
in only ten of the fifty states could even provide researchers with
baseline information regarding the frequency of the insanity plea
and its success, and that officials in twenty states could provide no
252
information whatsoever about the use of the plea.

One might contend, therefore, that this purpose violates the nexus
requirement on fairness-as-accuracy grounds2 53-after

all, the availa-

ble data indicate that because the insanity defense is used so infrequently, it is not really "abused." While probably true, the nature of
the rational basis test makes this argument untenable. Even if the decharged that the insanity defense "had been subject to unconscionable abuse by defendants." Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The Insanity Defense,
the AuthoritarianSpirit, the Fearof Faking,and the Culture of Punishmen4 82 IOWA L. REv. 1375,
1409 n.229 (1997). His comments, as Judge Gerber speculates, probably stemmed from
his reading of press accounts of United States v. Trapnell 495 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1974). See
Rudolph J. Gerber, The Insanity Defense Revisited, 1984 Amiz. ST. L.J. 83, 117-18. Jonas
Robitscher and Andrew Ky Haynes discuss the Trapnell case and its backdrop in greater
detail:
In [ Trapnell], the court admitted evidence that Trapnell, while a patient at a
hospital, had counseled a fellow patient, Padilla, about how to feign insanity. Padilla subsequently had charges against him dropped and attributed his success to Trapnell's teachings on the art of acting insane.
Trapnell apparently was quite good at feigning insanity. He was arrested at least twenty times for major crimes but served less than two years
in jail. He claimed that he could "fool psychiatrists and psychologists in
Florida, Texas, Maryland, New York, California, and Canada into believing
that he was a genuine 'Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde' normally a sane, honest
man, whose mind, every so often was taken over by a sinister alter ego called
'Greg Ross.'"
Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 16, at 36 n.99 (citation omitted) (quoting ALEXANDER D.
BROOKS, LAw, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE METrrAL HEALTH SYsTEM 318 (1974)).
252
PERLN, supra note 6, at 108 (footnote omitted).
253
See supra text accompanying notes 242-43 for a description of the "fairness-as-accuracy" concept.
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fense is used infrequently, it is still within the province of the legislature to consider the defense to be "abused." Abuse is a subjective
term, and such subjective determinations do not fall within the purview of fairness-as-accuracy. 254 In other words, even if most people
would not consider a defense that is used in only about one percent of
all criminal cases to be abused, and even if "malingering among in'
sanity defendants is, and traditionally has been, statistically low,

255

it

is not the goal of the courts in conducting rational basis review to
second-guess the legislature on what it considers the term "abuse" to
mean.
One might also argue that there exist other defenses that are
"abused" and that are raised much more frequently than the insanity
defense. Even if one were to accept this proposition as true, the rational basis test does not ask whether the law was the most sensible
means by which to carry out the purpose at issue, or whether the law
fully eradicated the problem it was enacted to solve. Such questions
are reserved only for higher levels of scrutiny. A legislature may address problems "one step at a time," and if it chooses to address and
remedy the "abuse" of the insanity defense before it addresses the
"abuse" of other defenses, that is certainly its prerogative. Again, all
the rational basis test asks is whether the law in question would be
rationally related to furthering the purpose at issue. Because fewer
defendants will be able to raise a defense based upon mental disease
or defect after the adoption of the mens rea approach (by virtue of
the approach's relevancy restrictions as to when a defendant would be
permitted to introduce such evidence 256 ), the purported "abuse" will
likely be lessened somewhat, and under the rational basis test, this is
254

See supra note 248 and accompanying text.

255

PEPRUN, supra note 6, at 239. Interestingly, Perlin observes:
In reality... it is much more likely that seriously mentally disabled criminal
defendants will feign sanity in an effort to not be seen as mentally ill, even
where such evidence might serve as powerful mitigating evidence in death
penalty cases. Thus, juveniles imprisoned on death row were quick to tell
Dr. Dorothy Lewis and her associates, "I'm not crazy," or "I'm not a retard."

Id. at 240-41 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (citing Dorothy Lewis et al.,
Neuropsychiatric,Psychoeducationa, and Family Characteristicsof 14Juveniles Condemned to Death
in the United States, 145 Am.J. PSYCHiATRY 584, 588 (1988)); see also People v. McCleary, 567
N.E.2d 434, 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (testimony from doctor finding defendant insane that
"defendant did not want to be known as a crazy person and, in fact was 'malingering sanity,'" and that "defendant was upset that mental illness was an issue in this case"). Compare
Wettstein & Mulvey, Disposition of Insanity Acquittees in llinois, 16 BuLL. Am.AcAD. PsYCHiATRY & L. 11, 15 (1988) (one of 137 insanity acquittees seen as malingering), with Grossman
& Wasyliw, A Psychiatric Study of Stereotypes: Assessment of Malingeringin a CriminalForensic
Group, 52J. PERSoNA rr ASSESSMNT 549 (1988) (concluding that twenty-two to thirty-nine

percent of all insanity defendants demonstrated evidence of minimizing their
psychopathology).
256 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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all that is required. Therefore, while not the most compelling of purposes, this one does pass muster under the rational basis test.
o To prevent the insanefrom being hastily released
It is also contended that NGRI acquittees are released too hastily,
spending much less time in custody than those who are convicted and
sentenced to prison. 257 Thus, another purpose for adopting the mens
rea approach might be to allow for more criminal convictions of a
class of insane defendants (those who possessed the requisite mens
rea) so that they are not released from custody as quickly. This purpose might appropriately be rephrased as "protecting public safety,"
which a court certainly would consider legitimate. And while it is unclear from the available data wlhether it is actually true that NGRI acquittees are released more quily than those defendants who are
convicted and sentenced to prison, 258 this lack of clarity, in itself, prohibits one from asserting a fairness-as-accuracy argument. Adopting
the mens rea approach can thus be said to be "rationally related" to
furthering this public safety purpose (at least within the meaning of
the rational basis test).
P To providefor treatment of the insane
257
See, e.g., Montana Executive Session Hearings, supra note 214 ("[Insanity acquittees]
could ... be out on the street again virtually overnight." (remarks of Rep. Keedy)).
258
For example, Perlin notes that

NGRI acquittees spend almost double the amount of time that defendants
convicted of similar charges spend in prison settings, and often face a lifetime of post-release judicial oversight. In California ... defendants found
NGRI for.., violent crimes [other than murder] were confined twice as
long as those found guilty of such charges, and those found NGRI of nonviolent crimes were confined for periods over nine times as long.
PERLIN, supra note 6, at 110-11 (footnote omitted). However, he also concedes that in
California, "the length of confinement for individuals acquitted by reason of insanity on
murder charges was less than for those convicted." Id. at 110. Additionally, Steadman discusses a number of studies, each yielding entirely different results. See HenryJ. Steadman,
Empifical Research on the Insanity Defense, 477 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 58, 65
(1985). To illustrate, in one study Steadman cites, in which forty-six New York insanity
acquittees were matched with the same number of felons on the basis of sex, county of
arrest, and criminal charge, the average length of detention for the insanity acquittees was
twenty-six days longer than it was for the matched felons. Id. However, in another New
York study utilizing fifty insanity acquittees and fifty felons, the insanity acquittees were
released, on average, 304 days before the matched felons. Id. In another set of data taken
from Connecticut, the insanity acquittees "spent substantially less time detained than the
felons who were matched with them on sex, race, age, and offense-639 days versus 1142
days. In only 2 of the 10 offense categories did the NGRI detentions exceed in length
those of the matched felons." Id. Finally, in a District of Columbia study in which no
matching was done, insanity acquittees averaged 1950 days of detention, whereas federal
prison inmates averaged 1050 days. Id. Notably, in that study, the lengths of NGRI hospitalizations exceeded those of inmate incarcerations in all nine offense categories. Id.
It is clear from this brief survey that the available data are not in agreement. Accordingly, legislatures are free to choose whichever set of data they find most convincing without violating fairness-as-accuracy.
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In the Idaho Legislature's "statement of purpose" accompanying
its mens rea approach statute, the legislature stated that one purpose
for the law was to "provide treatment for offenders in appropriate circumstances." 259 While this purpose would certainly be considered legitimate-and indeed, quite laudable-the mens rea approach is not
rationally related to achieving it, and thus it fails the nexus
requirement.
An inevitable result of adopting the mens rea approach is that
more defendants will be convicted and sent to prison, including those
who would be found NGRI under an extrinsic insanity defense.
Therefore, adoption of the mens rea approach would only be rationally related to treatment of the insane if defendants who are sent to
prison would be more likely to receive treatment than defendants who
would otherwise be sent to a mental health institution. This proposition is simply absurd.
It has become relatively clear that since the mid-1970s, the emphasis on rehabilitation as a central purpose of punishment has fallen
into strong disfavor, and has been almost completely replaced by a
focus upon retribution. 260 And while most prisons usually have some
treatment programs available to offenders, it can hardly be gainsaid
that the focus of prisons in today's society is not on treatment. Therefore, to assert that a mentally ill individual is more likely to receive
treatment in a state prison than he would if placed in a state mental
health institution, which exists for the very purpose of treatment, is
not even minutely logical.
e To hold individuals accountablefor their actions
One purpose often expressed for enacting insanity defense reforms, including the mens rea approach, is to hold individuals accountable for their actions. 2 61 This purpose might suffer from the
259 Idalw Legislature Statement of Purpose, supra note 214.
260 See, e.g., 1 LAFAvE & Scour, supra note 18, § 1.5, at 39-40. As LaFave and Scott
explain:
[S]kepticism regarding the rehabilitative model began developing in the
mid-1960's, and about ten years later there came "an explosion of criticism
...calling for restructuring of the theoretical underpinnings of the criminal sanction." This rejection of rehabilitation, usually in favor of a "just
deserts" theory, was .. .reflected by "aspate of legislative proposals, enacted or advocated throughout the country, that attack the statutory expressions of the rehabilitative ideal. The objects of this attack are sentencing
discretion, the indeterminate sentence, the parole function, the uses of
probation in cases of serious criminality, and even allowances of 'good
time' credit in the prisons."
Id. (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of DoingJustic4 1976 Wis. L. REv. 781; FRANCIS A.
ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 67 (1981)).
261 See, e.g., Montana Executive Session Hearings, supra note 214. During Representative
Keedy's speech, he stated that "[m]y purpose [for proposing Montana's mens rea approach statute] is to hold people accountable for their criminal acts." Id.
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same deficiency as the preceding purpose, in that while it is certainly
legitimate (as a core purpose of our criminal law is to hold individuals
accountable for their actions), whether the mens rea approach is rationally related to furthering this goal is dependent upon whether the
notion of "accountability" is framed as "personal accountability" or
"accountability in the eyes of the general public." If the former, I
would argue that such a purpose is illogical to the point that it would
fail the nexus requirement. Accountability connotes responsibility,
and one simply cannot say that individuals who could not appreciate
the consequences of their actions or understand that what they were
doing was wrong-even if they possessed the requisite intent (and
would thus be found guilty under the mens rea approach)-would
feel in some sense "responsible" for their acts, or would understand
why they were being punished. Indeed, just the opposite would be
true, as they would likely disavow any responsibility for their acts because of their mental illness.
If one frames the purpose as "holding individuals accountable in
the eyes of the public," however, then the mens rea approach would
be rationally related to achieving this purpose, so long as "holding
individuals accountable" is synonymous with finding individuals guilty
and punishing them instead of finding them NGRI and treating
them-which, as just discussed, is apparently the case. 262 Therefore,

framing the purpose in this manner would satisfy not only the legitimate purpose requirement, but also the nexus requirement.
o To eliminate confusion and inconsistency resultingfrom considering
mental illness in the guilt phase of the trial
Another purpose articulated by the Idaho Legislature in enacting
its mens rea approach statute was to "eliminate some of the confusion
and inconsistency which results from considering mental illness on
the question of guilt or innocence." 263 It is definitely legitimate for a
262
Of course, it might be argued that framing the purpose in this manner makes it
illegitimate, because "holding individuals accountable in the eyes of the public" cannot
give legislatures carte blanche to abolish any defense in order to accomplish this purpose.
What this argument is really attempting to say is that curtailing certain defenses would
violate due process, which is certainly true. Indeed, in Part III.A., I concluded that abolishing the extrinsic defense of insanity would likely violate due process. However, the rational
basis test is not concerned with such arguments; rather, it first asks if the purpose is legitimate in a general sense, which this particular purpose is, and then asks whether the law is
rationally related to furthering that purpose, which is also the case here. Inquiry into
whether the law violates another constitutional provision is certainly not foreclosed in such
an analysis, but such an inquiry is usually irrelevant for the purposes of determining
whether the law satisfies the requirements of equal protection-especially under the rational basis test.
263
Idaho Legislature Statement of Purpose,supra note 214. This purpose apparently stems
from the belief that the guilt phases of most insanity defense trials feature "battles of the
experts" that serve to overwhelm the jury, which allegedly results not only in creating uncertainty over the issue of defendant's sanity (the "confusion") but also in requiring case-
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state to want to eliminate confusion from its trial processes, thus allowing such processes to run more smoothly and efficiently. However,
whether the mens rea approach will ultimately advance this goal is less
dear.
The purpose, in and of itself, implies that taking the defendant's
mental disease or defect into account in the sentencing, as opposed to
the guilt, phase of trial somehow will lead to less "confusion" and "inconsistency." As to "confusion," I can see little difference between a
juror's confusion in making a determination of whether the defendant possessed the appropriate mens rea and his confusion in determining whether the defendant was insane-if anything, it seems that
making a mens rea determination would be more difficult or confusing
for a juror than would applying an insanity test. Further, the argument that experts somehow confuse jurors in the small percentage of
insanity defense cases in which "battles of the experts" do exist is
flawed in two respects. First, recent research demonstrates thatjurors
are not unduly influenced by experts' opinions, 264 and second, a trial
with experts probably should be more likely than a trial without experts to help a jury arrive at an appropriate determination of the defendant's sanity. Indeed, if experts were "confusing" to jurors by
virtue of their expert status alone, the same argument could be made
against experts used in any case and for any purpose. As to the "inconsistency" claim, by allowing only the sentencer to consider the defendant's mental disease or defect, the mens rea approach seems to
invite much more inconsistency insofar as it would allow sentence
durations to vary immensely depending on the type of disease, its
acuteness, and even on peculiarities between sentencing judges.
Thus, two defendants suffering from exactly the same illness might
receive sentences on opposite ends of the spectrum. It seems much
more justifiable to allow variation and inconsistency in the unspecified
duration of confinement given to insanity acquittees, if only because
such individuals are, at first, remanded to the custody of the state for
by-case decisionmaking (the "inconsistency"). See PERLIN, supra note 6, at 112. However,
this belief is both exaggerated and illogical. For instance, as to the claim that "battles of
the experts" frequently take place, Perlin begs to differ.
The empirical reality is quite different. In a Hawaii survey, there was examiner congruence on insanity in ninety-two percent of all cases; in Oregon,
prosecutors agreed to insanity verdicts in eighty percent of all cases[.] Most
importantly, these are not recent developments: over twenty-five years ago,
a study... found that between two-thirds and three-quarters of all insanity
defense acquittals were uncontested.
Id. at 113 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, while insanity trials may lead to jury verdicts
that are inconsistent in light of the facts of each case, case-specific determinations of culpability are inherent in our jury system and make inconsistencies among cases inevitable.
Indeed, such inconsistencies probably occur much more often in the non-insanity context.
264 See PERUN, supranote 6, at 112 n.181.
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an identical period of time (i.e., one that is indeterminate), and are
released only when certain criteria are met.
Again, however, as with the "preventing abuse" purpose, this purpose, as illogical as it may sound, is not so blatantly illogical that it fails
the nexus requirement (as the "provide for treatment" purpose did).
There would still be certain cases in which "battles of the experts"
would take place, just as there would still be inconsistencies in jury
verdicts in insanity defense cases. The terms "confusion" and "inconsistency," like "abuse," are terms of degree, and are thus subjective in
nature. While the mens rea approach may not be a wise step for a
legislature to take in order to effectuate this particular purpose, the
wisdom of a law is irrelevant under the rational basis test, and one
probably cannot say that the mens rea approach is not "rationally related" to achieving this purpose-it may be, even if only minutely.
ii.

Conclusion

While the application of the extremely deferential rational basis
test may, on occasion, result in the invalidation of a statute, as the
foregoing analysis demonstrates, this is not one of those occasions.
Indeed, even if, as one commentator has argued, insanity defense reform statutes seem to "express[ ] animosity toward mentally ill defendants" 265-a

proposition with which many would agree-this is entirely

irrelevant if even one conceivable purpose would satisfy the test's legitimate purpose and nexus requirements. And while the conceivable
purposes for the mens rea approach discussed in this subsection are
certainly not the most compelling, or even entirely logical, and while
not all of the purposes mentioned would satisfy the requirements of
the rational basis test, at least one such purpose would. Whether the
mens rea approach could withstand a higher level of scrutiny is highly
doubtful; however, unless and until courts are willing to extend such
heightened scrutiny to mental disease-based classifications-a time
that seems unlikely to arrive even in the distant future-states apparently will be free to abolish their extrinsic insanity defenses without
fear of violating equal protection.
C.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Eighth Amendment commands that "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." 266 In Ford v. Wainright,2 67 the Court held that
what is cruel and unusual embraces at least what was considered to be
265

266
267

Leblanc-Allman, supra note 227, at 1112.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted,2 68 and in
Penry v. Lynaugh,269 the Court stated that "[i] t was well settled at common law that... 'lunatics[ ]' were not subject to punishment for criminal acts committed under [that] incapacit[y]."270 Taken together, it
seems difficult to reconcile these two decisions with the notion that
punishing the insane is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. In
the end, however, a cruel and unusual punishment claim is not likely
to be successful because the Court seems to open its ears to such
claims only when the death penalty is involved. For example, in Coker
v. Georgia,27 1 the Court held that a death sentence for the crime of
rape constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 272 However, with the
death penalty not at issue, the Court has upheld what some might
consider draconian punishments for crimes nowhere near as serious
as rape. 2 73 Similarly, while the Court held in Ford that an insane per-

son cannot be executed, 2 74 it seems likely that if the death penalty is
not implicated, the Court would not entertain an Eighth Amendment
claim.

2 75

268 Id. at 405.
269 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
270 Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
271 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
272 See id. at 600.
273 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding life sentence under recidivist statute
for defendant who had been successively convicted of fraudulently using credit card to
obtain $80 worth of goods or services, passing forged check in the amount of $28.36, and
obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses).
It is notable that the Ninth Circuit recently held that, as applied, California's "Three
Strikes" law violated the Eighth Amendment where a life sentence was imposed for the
theft of nine videotapes worth $153.54. See Andrade v. Att'y Gen., 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. granted sub nom. Lockyer v. Andrade, 70 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2002) (No.
01-1127). However, Andrade departed sharply from the principles espoused in Harmelin
and Rummen4 and it was thus not terribly surprising that the Court decided to grant certiorari. As mentioned earlier, see supra Part II.B.3, while it can be dangerous to jump to
conclusions from a grant or a denial of certiorari, I would venture that the Court's purpose
in granting certiorari in this case is to reverse the decision of the Ninth Circuit and reaffirm its commitment to an extremely narrow (if not nonexistent) Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement in the noncapital context.
274 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
275
Cf Harmelin,501 U.S. at 995-96 (stating that "because of the qualitative difference
between death and all other penalties ....[w]e have drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at capital cases, and see no basis for extending it further"); id. at 994 (noting the existence of "several respects in which we have held that 'death is different,' and
have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides"). Of course, this is
not to say that the Court would not intervene on Eighth Amendment grounds if a sufficiently unusual punishment short of the death penalty, such as corporal punishment, were
to be imposed on an offender. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct 2242, 2265 (2002) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("The Eighth Amendment is addressed to always-and-everywhere 'cruel'
punishments, such as the rack and the thumbscrew.").
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This is not to imply, though, that such a claim lacks merit. While
the holding of Ford may not extend to the issue of punishing the insane outside the context of the death penalty, its logic certainly does.
The Court in Ford noted that the Eighth Amendment recognizes the
"'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing

society."'

276

The Court also declared that in "determining whether a

particular punishment comports with the fundamental human dignity
that the Amendment protects," it must "take[ ] into account objective
evidence of contemporary values," 277 and, as the Court stated in Penry,
"The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures. ' 278 As
mentioned above, in examining the national trend, it is fairly clear
that contemporary values mandate the existence of an extrinsic in-

sanity defense, as all but four states possess, and have always possessed,
279
this type of statutory scheme.
Assuming the Court is willing to entertain an Eighth Amendment

claim, the success of such a challenge will depend on how the Court
characterizes this minority of states. If the Court views these states as
too deviant regarding contemporary values, then it will likely strike
down the mens rea approach as cruel and unusual. However, if the
Court sees these states as beginning a trend in the opposite direction
(as might be evidenced by the consideration of similar mens rea approach statutes in the legislatures of a handful of other states 280 ), then
it might be more willing to uphold the abolition of the defense on the
28 1
ground that contemporary values are changing.

276 Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
277 Id.
278 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
279 See supra Part I.B.2.
280 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
281
The uncertainty of what the Court's answer might be is only exacerbated by its
recent discussion in Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), which held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded criminals. Atkins highlights the
inherent malleability in ascertaining the content of "contemporary values," even where
objective evidence is readily available. The majority found that because eighteen states
(forth-seven percent of states permitting capital punishment) had enacted laws forbidding,
in whole or in part, the execution of the mentally retarded, a "national consensus" against
the practice could be said to exist; as a result, it was contrary to contemporary values and
thus constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 2248-49. However dubious this conclusion
might be, see id. at 2262-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disputing existence of national consensus), it is certainly not the case that adoption of the mens rea approach by only eight
percent of the states could be regarded as compelling evidence of a change in contemporary values, as ninety-two percent of the states do not punish the insane. See id. at 2262
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "[olur prior cases have generally required a much
higher degree of agreement [than forty-seven percent] before finding a punishment cruel
and unusual on 'evolving standards' grounds").
Yet the majority does not rest its hat on numbers alone, asserting that "[iut is not so
much the number of these states that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
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CONCLUSION

While it has not yet confronted this country's highest court, the
abolition of the extrinsic defense of insanity in favor of the mens rea
approach has become a hotly contested issue among legal scholars as
well as the few state court judges who have grappled with it. It clearly
raises questions of constitutional magnitude in the areas of due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment, and although my analysis demonstrates that an equal protection challenge
would almost undoubtedly fail, and that a cruel and unusual punishment challenge may or may not succeed, even challenges based upon
due process-which the mens rea approach plainly violates-have
thus far fallen upon deaf ears in state courts.
28 2
Justice Holmes's expression that "hard cases make bad law"

may not always ring true. However, for at least three such cases-State
v. Searcy,28 3 State v. Cowan,28 4 and State v. Herrera2 8 5-the resulting law
was definitely as Holmes predicted it would be. Aside from the results
the courts ultimately reached, what is most troubling about these cases
is that the poor reasoning rampant throughout the decisions appears
to be the product of little more than highly manipulative, outcomebased decisionmaking. The issue of insanity defense reform is, no
doubt, a political hotbed. Moreover, the issue concerns a relatively
small, unpopular group of individuals who are unable to participate
meaningfully in the political process and therefore are highly vulnerable. While it should be the goal of the courts to interpret the Constitution correctly every time, the political popularity of insanity defense
change." Id. at 2249. As Justice Scalia correctly notes in critici4ng this argument, it is the
use of this type of factor that inevitably results in the dilution of the objective nature of the
constitutional standard:
The Court attempts to bolster its embarrassingly feeble evidence of "consensus" with the following- "It is not so much the number of these States
that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change." But in
what other direction could we possibly see change? Given that 14 years ago all
the death penalty statutes included the mentally retarded, any change (except precipitate undoing of what had just been done) was bound to be in the
one direction the Court finds significant enough to overcome the lack of
real consensus.
Id. at 2263 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Indeed, importing such subjective factors into the overall determination of the existence of a national
consensus would permit courts to conclude, for example, that because four states have
adopted the mens rea approach and others are considering it, the "trend" is such that a
national consensus does not exist against the punishment of the insane. Certainly, even the
mere possibility of such an absurd conclusion being reached is troubling, for as Justice
Scalia observed, "[R] eliance upont 'trends' . . . is a perilous basis for constitutional adjudication." Id
282 N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
283
798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990).
284 861 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1993).
285 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995).
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reform certainly makes result-oriented and politically motivated decisionmaking all the more tempting. Judges in state courts ordinarily
are elected and face the prospect of reelection or retention at some
point.286 Therefore, they can be especially prone to such transgres-

sions, particularly with an issue such as the punishment of the insane-after all, no judge's reelection chances increase if the public
sees her as "the judge who lets insane people go free." Of course, this
is not to say that political pressure ends at the stairs of the federal
courts either, as "even federal judges are sensitive to the role that public acceptance plays in legitimizing their authority."287 However, for
the sake of the basic principles upon which our system of criminal
justice was founded, one can only hope that when the Supreme Court
eventually takes on the issue-and we can rest assured that someday it
will-it does not, like the legislatures and courts of four of our states,
choose to ignore the foundations of our jurisprudence and follow the
political path of least resistance.

286
See AN INDEPENDENTJUDICIARv- REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE § V.B (1997), at http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/
judiciary/report.html.
287 Mandiberg, supra note 21, at 271 (citing Stephen L. Wasby, Arrogation of Power or
Accountability: JudicialImperialism' Revisited, 65 JUDICATURE 208, 218-19 (1981)).

